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May 12, 2026

  1. BufferIssue with Channel Settings

    The issue with loading the Channel Settings page has been fully resolved, and it’s functioning as expected again. If you encounter any further problems, please don’t hesitate to reach out to our team.

    Resolved

  2. 1PasswordLogin and Sync Issues

    # Incident Postmortem - Login and Sync Issues **Date of Incident:** 2026-04-27 **Time of Incident \(UTC\):** 14:15 - 15:41 **Service\(s\) Affected:** All web APIs **Impact Duration:** Approximately 86 minutes ## Summary On April 27, 2026, [1Password.com](http://1password.com/) experienced a period of elevated error and full service unavailability in our USA/Global region. A defect deployed in application scaling logic caused a cascading failure during peak usage. This resulted in a period of service unavailability for customers in the USA/Global region. This was not a security incident, and there was no loss of data. ## Impact on Customers * **Sign-in and account access:** Customers in the USA/Global region experienced errors or were unable to sign in or access their 1Password accounts between approximately 14:15 and 15:41 UTC on April 27, 2026. * **All 1Password clients:** The disruption applied to all client types, including the web app, CLI, browser extensions, and desktop and mobile applications, for customers connecting through the USA/Global region. * **Geographic regions affected:** Only customers on the USA/Global region were affected. Other regions were not impacted. ## What Happened? We deployed a change to how our services signal their readiness to serve requests, which contained a latent defect. * **Timeline of events:** * **2026-04-27 14:15 UTC** - Load increase triggers issues. * **2026-04-27 14:29 UTC** - Incident declared; response team mobilized. * **2026-04-27 15:41 UTC** - Issue identified and fix deployed. * **2026-04-28 18:06 UTC** - Incident formally resolved following monitoring. ## How Was It Resolved? Our on-call engineering team identified the scaling logic as the cause of the cascading failure and disabled it via a configuration change. Once disabled, capacity was restored, and traffic recovered. A subsequent configuration change was made to prevent this logic from being re-enabled in production environments. ## What We Are Doing to Prevent Future Incidents * **Immediate fix:** We disabled the defective health check logic and locked the configuration to prevent it from being re-enabled in production. * **Retrospective:** We are conducting a full retrospective with the incident responders to identify further improvements to our systems and our response processes. ## Next Steps and Communication * No action is required from our customers at this time. We are committed to providing a reliable and stable service, and we are taking the necessary steps to learn from this event and prevent it from happening again. Thank you for your patience and understanding. Sincerely, The 1Password Team

    Resolved

  3. HubSpotHubSpot may be unavailable for some users

    Between 02:47 PM (UTC +01:00) and 03:15 PM (UTC +01:00), some customers in all affected regions experienced issues with all impaired tools. This was caused by a database impairment. As of 03:15 PM (UTC +01:00), our all impaired tools are working properly and the incident has been fully resolved. HubSpot conducts a thorough review after each incident to understand the cause and prevent it from happening again. Learn more about HubSpot's commitment to reliability at www.HubSpot.com/reliability. The information on this page reflects our understanding of the incident and impact at the time of the update.

    Resolved

  4. GitHubIncident with Pull Requests

    On May 6, 2026 between 15:12 and 19:02 UTC creation of new pull request review threads on GitHub.com failed. This included new line comments and file comments on pull requests. Existing PRs and previously created comments were unaffected. <br /><br />This incident was caused by a 32-bit integer key reaching its maximum value in a Vitess lookup table used during PR thread creation. The primary table had been migrated to a 64-bit integer key but the Vitesse lookup table remained 32-bit. Once the values in the primary table passed the available 32-bit ID space in the lookup table, attempts to create new review threads began failing, resulting in near 100% failure rate for new thread creation requests. We mitigated the issue by updating the impacted lookup table definitions across all shards to use 64-bit integer column types, increasing the available ID range and restoring normal operation. Service was fully restored once the schema changes competed globally. <br /><br />To help prevent similar incidents, we are expanding existing monitoring of database columns to include Vitess lookup tables to notify in advance of any tables that is approaching a column size limit. This work is intended to provide earlier detection of columns approaching size limits before customer impact occurs.

    Resolved

  5. PostHogAnalytics: query timeouts/failures

    This is now fixed. No data was lost. We identified an issue affecting analytics queries (timeouts and/or failures). Dashboards, insights, and other query-driven views may have been slow or unavailable.

    Resolved

  6. PlivoInbound call failures in India region

    Dear Valued Customer, We recently experienced intermittent Inbound Call failures in India region. Our engineering and operations teams promptly investigated and resolved the issue. The root cause was identified, and corrective actions have been implemented to prevent recurrence. Incident Start Time: 12th May 2026 10:50 UTC Incident End Time: 12th May 2026 11:20 UTC If you have any questions or concerns regarding this incident, please contact Plivo Support. Support portal: https://support.plivo.com/hc/en-us

    Resolved

  7. StripeElevated Swish errors

    From 09:09–09:48 UTC, we saw a partial service disruption of the Swish payment method. This is now resolved.

    Resolved

  8. TrueLayer Data API Degraded Performance

    We experienced a service degradation with our Data API. Our clients may have received errors when refreshing data access tokens. Normal service has now been restored. Impact start time: 12/05/2026, 08:56 UTC Impact end time: 12/05/2026, 09:19 UTC Client actions: None

    Resolved

  9. UpstashQStash US Region Service Disruption

    **Root Cause Analysis** On **April 24**, we deployed a more optimized scheduler implementation in the **US East \(N. Virginia\)** region. On **May 8**, a user who had active schedules deleted their account. Under normal behavior, scheduled tasks associated with a deleted account should wake up, detect that the account no longer exists, and exit after performing cleanup. Due to a bug introduced in the new scheduler implementation, this code path did not return early as intended. Execution continued and resulted in a nil pointer dereference. A second issue then amplified the impact. When a panic occurs in the scheduler, it is designed to be recovered, logged, and isolated so that the process remains healthy. Because of another bug in the panic recovery path, the panic was not properly caught, which caused the worker process handling the scheduled job to terminate. After that process exited, another worker picked up responsibility for delivering the same scheduled task. Since the same faulty execution path was still present, that worker also failed. This created a cascading failure pattern across workers attempting to process the affected schedules. **Resolution** We deployed two fixes: * Added the missing early return in the deleted-account cleanup path, preventing the nil pointer dereference. * Corrected the panic recovery logic so that future panics are safely recovered, logged, and reported without causing worker processes to terminate. With these changes in place, the affected execution path is now safe. Even if a future bug triggers a panic in this area, it will be isolated and reported rather than causing process-level failure.

    Resolved

  10. SnykSnyk Recurring Tests Delayed

    We are no longer observing delays affecting our Recurring Tests as a result of the mitigation actions taken. The Snyk Incident Response has now been stood down.

    Resolved

  11. RetoolIssue with MotherDuck Resources

    MotherDuck is fully operational again. We identified and fixed a caching issue that required us to temporarily disable the integration. Access has been restored as of May 11, 2026. We apologize for the disruption.

    Resolved

  12. monday.comDelay in the Activity Log

    The issue causing a delay in the activity logs has been successfully resolved. Please refresh your browser to access the platform. Thank you for your patience.

    Resolved

May 11, 2026

  1. Box[Minor] Issue affecting Logins

    We recently addressed an issue affecting logins to Box. We would like to take the opportunity to further explain this issue and the steps we have taken to keep it from happening in the future. Between **4:46 PM PDT** and **5:32 PM PDT** on **March 9, 2026**, some users may have experienced difficulties logging in to Box leading to disruptions when using some Box features. This issue occurred when a service involved in the login process did not have sufficient resources to handle an uneven spike in traffic, which caused a portion of login-related requests to time out. We resolved this by increasing resources for the affected service and expanding its capacity. We also took additional steps to reduce the likelihood that this type of issue could affect the login experience in the future. ## **Analysis** The incident surfaced opportunities to further refine how we size and distribute capacity across services that support login-related traffic. It also underscored the value of strengthening earlier detection of traffic imbalances and simplifying dependencies within critical login flows. ## **Corrective Actions** Box has initiated the following corrective actions: * **Strengthen resource allocation and scaling:** We are tuning resource allocation and scaling behavior so services can better absorb unusual traffic patterns without degradation. * **Improve traffic distribution and monitoring:** We are refining how traffic is distributed across service instances and strengthening monitoring so we can identify and address unhealthy capacity patterns sooner. * **Reduce login path dependencies:** We are simplifying the login flow so fewer background checks are required for most users, reducing the potential impact of issues in supporting services. ‌ We are continuously working to improve Box and want to make sure we are delivering the best product and user experience we can. We hope we have provided some clarity here and we would be happy to answer any questions you may still have regarding this matter. Sincerely, The Box Team

    Resolved

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