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Oct 22, 2026

  1. SlackSlack Real-Time Connection Disruption

    Some Slack customers experienced disrupted real-time connections, delayed message delivery, and errors loading conversation history on October 22, 2026, starting at 16:08 UTC. A large number of active connections closed at once and then reconnected, which briefly strained the services customers rely on to send and read messages. By 16:26 UTC, connections had reconnected and service had returned to normal. We apologize for how this incident affected you and your business. We will undertake a full investigation of the incident, establishing the technical trigger, the underlying cause, and preventive action to avoid a repeat in the future.

    Resolved

  2. Fly.ioDegraded Edge Performance

    Between ~18:00 - 18:10 UTC today we saw degraded edge performance across multiple regions. Customers may have noticed elevated numbers of dropped connections or longer than usual connection times reaching their apps during this period. A fix was applied and edge performance is back to normal levels.

    Resolved

  3. StripeElevated Bancontact errors

    From 14:08 - 16:26 UTC there was a partial service disruption of the Bancontact payment method. Users may have experienced increased error rates for transactions processed through the Bancontact payment method. This issue was external to Stripe and is now resolved.

    Resolved

  4. PantheonPHP Vulnerabilities CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619

    Overnight monitoring continues to show persistent but limited probing, which is being blocked. Our rollout of updated PHP images across customer environments including LTS versions was complete as of 5pm Pacific time yesterday. We will continue to observe and may provide further analysis of our findings, but we are closing this incident.

    Resolved

  5. SendGridIntelligent Alerts Delivery Issues

    The issue affecting intelligent alert notifications for messaging metric anomalies has been resolved, and the service is functioning normally at this time

    Resolved

  6. TwilioIntelligent Alerts Delivery Issues

    The issue affecting intelligent alert notifications for messaging metric anomalies has been resolved, and the service is functioning normally at this time

    Resolved

  7. ZapierDelayed real-time updates in Zapier Tables

    The issue affecting real-time updates in Zapier Tables has been resolved. Collaborator changes and refreshed formula results should now appear normally. If you continue to experience issues, please contact our support team "support team": https://zapier.com/app/get-help.

    Resolved

  8. Ablyissue with rewind=1 and persist-last in some situations

    Between about 14:00 UTC on the 20th and 17:00 on the 21st, on channels with the persist last message (https://ably.com/docs/channels#rules) channel rule enabled, attachments with `rewind=1` in situations where the most recent message was published over two minutes ago but still somewhat recently (and where the channel has been continuously active in a given region since the message was published) may not have had that rewound message correctly delivered to the attaching client. We apologise to anyone whose application was affected by this.

    Resolved

  9. LinodeService Issue - Linode Kubernetes Engine

    On October 22, 2026, starting around 11:10 UTC, a new Debian Kubernetes image was made available. The metadata for that image included malformed data, which resulted in Linode provisioning failures on LKE clusters due to validation errors. Akamai immediately began investigating the issue and working to correct it.  We corrected the malformed data at 12:50 UTC on October 22, 2026 and service was restored.  This summary provides an overview of our current understanding of the incident given the information available. Our investigation is ongoing, and any information herein is subject to change.

    Resolved

  10. ZapierAssessment of recently reported PHP vulnerabilities

    Our investigation into the reported PHP vulnerabilities is complete. We found no impact on Zapier services or customer data. This advisory is now closed. Security FAQ: PHP Vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) "1. What is this issue? Two vulnerabilities were disclosed in PHP, an open-source programming language. Both can lead to remote code execution under certain conditions. They affect PHP 8.2 before 8.2.35, 8.3 before 8.3.36, 8.4 before 8.4.27, and 8.5 before 8.5.12. 2. Is Zapier affected? Our investigation is complete, and we found no impact on Zapier services or customer data. 3. Has customer data been affected? No. Our investigation found no impact to customer data. 4. Does this affect the Zapier WordPress integration for example? The Zapier WordPress plugin itself is not vulnerable. WordPress sites run on PHP, though, so site owners should make sure their PHP version is patched (see question 1 for the affected versions). 5. Could PHP applications I host be affected? Possibly. Applications you run yourself, including on third-party hosting platforms, may be vulnerable if they run an affected PHP version, regardless of Zapier. We recommend updating to a patched PHP version. "

    Resolved

  11. LiveKitDegraded SIP Performance in US West

    **Root Cause** On 2026-10-16, a subset of SIP calls in our US West region failed. Two of our SIP servers advertised IPv6 addresses for signaling and media, which many carrier providers don't support. Carriers rejected outbound calls routed through these servers, and inbound calls were answered but dropped almost immediately without audio. We had recently started running SIP in a US West cluster that uses both IPv4 and IPv6 networking and our SIP servers didn't enforce IPv4 addresses. **Technical Details** When a SIP server starts, it determines its public address by querying an external address-lookup service. On the two affected servers, our primary lookup service didn't respond in time so they fell back to a backup service that returned their IPv6 address instead. Nothing in the SIP server checked that the address it advertised was IPv4. **Timeline \(UTC\)** 2026-10-16 14:49 - First affected SIP server started with an IPv6 address; call failures began 2026-10-16 15:41 - Second affected SIP server started with an IPv6 address 2026-10-16 ~15:48 - Customers began reporting failures to our support team 2026-10-16 15:58 - SIP traffic began moving away from the final affected cluster due to automatic cluster draining 2026-10-16 15:59 - Last affected call; customer impact ended 2026-10-16 17:08 - Began rolling out the long term fix requiring the usage of IPv4 2026-10-16 ~21:28 - Fix rollout completed 2026-10-16 ~22:30 - SIP traffic restored to the affected cluster **Scope of Impact** Between 14:49 and 15:59 UTC on 2026-10-16, SIP calls handled by the two affected servers in US West failed. During that window, about 14% of outbound calls in US West were rejected at setup and about 5% of inbound calls were answered and then dropped without audio. **Detection and Response** Our customers noticed this before our monitoring did. Our alerts watch for error-level logs, but carrier rejections are logged as routine events since they happen during normal operation. We also weren't tracking call failure rates on individual servers so our on-call engineers were paged in manually about an hour after the first failure. **Mitigations and Follow-ups** * We deployed a fix so SIP servers only use IPv4 addresses when determining their public address. * We'll add safeguards and automated tests to ensure a SIP server's call setup messages only contain IPv4 addresses. * We are additionally adding improvements in monitoring so that we can proactively detect and prevent these sorts of failures. We apologize for the disruption this caused. We appreciate your understanding and are committed to continuously improving our platform's reliability. If you have any questions, please reach out to our support team.

    Resolved

  12. GitHubDegraded availability for GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages and Webhooks

    On October 19, 2026, between 15:24 and 16:52 UTC, GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages, and webhooks generated by Actions were degraded. Live updates on GitHub.com and code search were also degraded for part of this time. No data was lost. <br /><br />Impact <br /><br /> - Workflow status updates, logs, and checks were delayed. <br /> - 5.13% of jobs on GitHub-hosted runners were delayed in starting, and 0.02% of workflow runs failed. <br /> - During the first 30 minutes, 8.47% of requests to the Actions jobs REST API returned errors. <br /><br />Pages deployments and webhooks generated by Actions runs were delayed. <br /><br />An internal Actions service that stores logs and run status lost connections to some of its cache servers in one cloud region and immediately retried them from every server at once. The resulting surge of new connections overloaded a shared network link between our data center and that region, which also disrupted other services that use the same link. We mitigated the incident by moving the Actions service off the affected cache servers and reducing connections from other services on the link. We then processed the delayed Actions work. We are continuing to investigate the cause of the initial connection timeouts. <br /><br />We were already in the process of rolling out a limit on how quickly this service can open new connections, but it was still in shadow mode (logging only, not enforcing) at the time of the incident. We have since fully enforced it and capped the service's concurrent connection attempts. We are extending these limits to other Actions services, adding backoff to retries, limiting how much shared network capacity a single service can use, and improving alerting so we can find the source of connection surges faster.

    Resolved

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