Jina AIService outage: s.jina.ai
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Outages and recoveries from the services you depend on.
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Status changed to major_outage. See new incident for details.
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The incident has been resolved and voice calls from a subset of Twilio Mobile Numbers to network subscribers in Brazil are operating normally.
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The incident has been resolved and voice calls from a subset of Twilio Mobile Numbers to network subscribers in Brazil are operating normally.
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This issue has been resolved. The Notion MCP query_data_source tool is available again in Claude clients.
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HubSpot is aware of the recently disclosed PHP security vulnerability. PHP isn't part of HubSpot's infrastructure, and we are not aware of any impact to our platform or customers. We will continue to watch the situation and provide an update if our assessment changes.
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Our team is analyzing the impact affecting billing processing on the Twilio platform. We apologize for the inconvenience and for any confusion this may have caused.
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Our team is analyzing the impact affecting billing processing on the Twilio platform. We apologize for the inconvenience and for any confusion this may have caused.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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## Summary On October 19, 2026, between 16:34 and 17:03 UTC and again between 17:47 and 17:54 UTC, some room management, agent dispatch and SIP API requests failed for rooms hosted in our US Central \(Chicago\) region. Requests from other regions that targeted those rooms also failed. During these windows some rooms could not be created or joined, and some agents were not dispatched. The cause was CPU exhaustion on the node running one of our message bus instances in US Central. A recently deployed overlay network used more CPU than it requested, and because our monitoring tracked CPU per pod rather than per node, we didn't see the node run out. That message bus instance began dropping messages, and a room-coordination service that depended on it stopped completing requests. We have moved the message bus in US Central onto larger nodes and resized other regions at similar risk. Node-level CPU alerting and automatic recovery for the coordination service are in progress. ## Impact Between 16:34 and 17:03 UTC, and again from 17:47 to 17:54 UTC, room management \(RoomService\), agent dispatch \(AgentDispatchService\) and SIP APIs failed for some rooms hosted in US Central. Because every region relies on the same coordination step, requests from other US regions that targeted those rooms failed as well. Affected requests returned a 503. Agent dispatch was the most affected. During the first window, 26.5% of rooms that requested an agent did not receive one. During the second window, 17.5% did not. Rooms hosted in other regions, and requests that did not target US Central rooms, were not affected. ## Root Cause Changes to room state, such as creating a room or dispatching an agent, must be confirmed by several servers before they take effect. A coordination service gathers those confirmations over our internal messaging system. If a quorum doesn't arrive within one second, the change fails. We recently rolled out a new overlay network for traffic between regions. It is more resilient to packet loss, but uses more CPU than its predecessor. In US Central, the message bus had little CPU headroom, and traffic was uneven: one of the three instances carried more than the other two combined, and its load had nearly doubled over the preceding hours. The overlay runs on every node and carries each message the message bus sends or receives. To guard against packet loss, it sends each message over several relay paths, so its CPU use climbs with message traffic. So that time-sensitive packet delivery is never throttled, the overlay can use more CPU than it requests, and it runs at a higher scheduling priority than the message bus. On the busiest instance's node, the two together pushed CPU above 90% and starved the message bus. At 16:34 UTC, routine node maintenance moved another messaging server to a new host, and its clients reconnected to the remaining servers. Shortly after, one coordination instance stopped getting replies through the overloaded server. New requests still reached it, but the responses it needed to finish them did not. Within four minutes it had stopped completing requests entirely. The coordination service is built to tolerate the loss of an instance: when one fails, another takes over its work. But this instance had not failed outright. Some messages still reached it, so it kept reporting itself healthy, and callers kept waiting on it instead of moving on. They retried, and request volume to it rose more than tenfold. Its unfinished updates also blocked changes to the same rooms in other US regions. We ended the first window by replacing the instance manually. The second window began when the instance that took over its busiest work stalled the same way, because the message bus was still short of CPU. Our monitoring did not catch the saturation. We monitored CPU for each pod against its own request, and relied on Kubernetes to keep nodes from being overloaded. That works only while every workload stays within its request. The message bus never exceeded its request, and the overlay's extra use did not show up in pod-level monitoring, so the node's saturation went unseen. Our error-rate alerts fired within four minutes, but nothing pointed to the node. ## Timeline \(UTC\) * 16:34 - Routine node maintenance moves a messaging server in US Central to a new host. API failures begin for rooms hosted in the region. * 16:38 - Automated monitoring detects elevated error rates across several US regions, and our team begins investigating. * 16:55 - The affected room-coordination instance is identified and replaced. * 17:03 - Error rates return to baseline. * 17:35 - We mark the incident resolved on this status page. The root cause is not yet known. * 17:47 - Errors return as the instance that took over the busiest work degrades in the same way. * 17:52 - That instance is replaced. Error rates return to baseline by 17:54. * 17:59 - A further instance showing early signs of the same problem is replaced. * 18:14 - New rooms are placed in other regions while the investigation continues. * 20:53 - CPU exhaustion on the messaging host is identified as the root cause. * 21:36 - Messaging servers in US Central are moved to larger hosts. * 22:51 - US Central resumes hosting new rooms. ## Corrective Actions & Prevention **Done** * **Increased CPU for the message bus in US Central.** The region's message bus now runs on larger nodes. * **Other regions resized.** We checked peak utilization across every region and moved messaging servers in regions at similar risk onto larger hosts. * **Automatic diagnostic capture.** The room-coordination service now records detailed diagnostics if a stall recurs. **Underway** * **Node-level CPU alerting.** We are adding CPU alerts for each node that carries internal traffic, alongside our pod-level monitoring, and alerts on CPU scheduling delays. * **Deadline-miss alerting.** A room-coordination instance that keeps missing its deadline will page our team. * **Automatic recovery for room coordination.** An instance that stops completing requests will hand off its work, and callers will route away from unhealthy instances. * **Retry limits.** Room-coordination requests will use backoff and a retry budget, so a stalled instance can no longer multiply request volume across regions. * **Messaging client reconnects.** Clients will reconnect automatically when a subscription stops receiving messages. * **Reserved CPU for the network overlay.** Hosts that run our messaging servers will reserve CPU for the overlay, so it cannot starve the servers it carries. We sincerely apologize for the disruption. If you have questions or were affected in ways not described here, please reach out to our support team.
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This incident has been resolved.
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Fix has been deployed and tested. Android builds are succeeding.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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We can confirm that the issue was mitigated at approximately 22:00 UTC on 21 October 2026, and the service has resumed normal operation. Customers and partners can view additional details about the incident by logging in to: https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/feed/0D5a700001aOfDBCA0 or reaching out to Akamai Support. We apologize for the impact and thank you for your patience and continued support. We are committed to making continuous improvements to make our systems better and prevent a recurrence of this issue.
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved. For a subset of customers, our ingestion pipeline was unresponsive to incoming beacons at 22:04 UTC. While our SDKs are programmed to retry, there is the potential for delayed or lost beacons at and around that time. Delayed/lost beacons would disrupt our realtime metrics and alerting. Missing beacons may also result in some missing event data for views being generated at that time.
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**Root Cause** During a security rotation of access credentials, we revoked a storage credential that we believed was no longer in use. It was still being used by our observability platform, which stores the data behind the dashboard and the Analytics API, the Agent Insights data that agents upload at the end of each session, and by the service that serves that data back for downloads and Agent Simulations. Once the credential was revoked, uploads failed in all regions. Restoring service took longer than a credential swap normally would for three reasons: * New credentials had to be set up, and each affected service had to be updated to use them. * The new credentials took longer than expected to become available in all regions \(about two hours in our US East region\). * Once the observability platform was working again, we found additional services that also needed updating. The incident was resolved once they were updated. **Timeline \(UTC\)** * 2026-10-13 08:13 - A storage credential is revoked during a security rotation. Observability uploads begin failing in all regions. * 08:15 - Agent Insights transcript and audio downloads and Agent Simulations begin failing. * 09:39 - Our team detects the failures and opens an incident. * 10:45 - The revoked credential is identified as the cause. * 11:16 - Affected services are reconfigured to use a new credential. * 12:40 - The new credential takes effect in the last region. Observability uploads recover in all regions. * 13:13 - Agent Insights downloads recover. * 13:26 - Agent Simulations recover. * 13:30 - Incident resolved. * 2026-10-17 - Recovery of observability data from the impact window completes \(see below\). **Scope of Impact** * **Observability uploads \(08:13 to 12:40 UTC, all regions\):** Observability data written during this window, including the data behind the dashboard and the Analytics API, failed to store. Nearly all agent sessions that ended in this window also failed to upload their Agent Insights data, so in Agent Insights these sessions were missing from the sessions list, or shown as "In progress". Agent sessions themselves ran normally, and media and calls were not affected. * **Data recovery:** In our resolved update we said all Agent Insights data from this window was unrecoverable. We have since restored most of it. **Session recordings and transcripts from this window are permanently lost.** All other observability data for these sessions has been restored and is visible in the dashboard and through the Analytics API. * **Agent Insights downloads \(08:15 to 13:13 UTC\):** Downloading transcripts and audio for existing sessions failed during the incident window. * **Agent Simulations \(08:15 to 13:26 UTC\):** Simulation runs couldn't load conversation transcripts, so they finished without a summary or verdict, or were cancelled. Runs from this window need to be re-run. * **Billing:** Agent Insights usage is only recorded after a successful upload, so failed uploads were **not** billed. **Detection and Response** We detected this issue about 85 minutes after it began. We did not have alerting on upload failures to observability storage, so it was caught when an engineer noticed elevated errors rather than by an automated alert. We also initially marked the incident resolved once uploads recovered, before confirming that Agent Simulations and downloads had recovered too. **Mitigations and Follow-ups** * We have added alerting that pages our on-call team when observability storage uploads fail, along with a continuous check that stored data can still be read and downloaded and an end-to-end test that verifies our storage credentials still work. * We have built tooling to replay and restore observability data from a past window, which we used to recover data from this incident. * We are moving these services to dedicated service credentials managed with our infrastructure and auditing other services for the same pattern. * We have updated our credential rotation process to verify every consumer of a credential before revoking it, and to account for regional propagation delays when rolling out replacements. * We are adding redundancy so a single failed credential can no longer stop observability uploads. We sincerely apologize for the disruption. We appreciate your understanding and are committed to continuously improving our platform's reliability. If you have any questions, please reach out to our support team.
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We think the impact from the issue is over.
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This incident has been resolved.
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The incident has been resolved and SMS delivery from a subset of Twilio Alphanumeric Sender Type to Jazz network subscribers in Pakistan is operating normally.
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