Live outage feed

Outages and recoveries from the services you depend on.

Earlier incidents

40 incidents

Back to latest

Feb 12, 2026

  1. LambdaLaunch failures in us-east-1

    Severity Level: Low The incident has been resolved. VM launches are now working as expected in the us-east-1 region. Thank you for your patience and understanding during this time.

    Resolved

  2. LovableHigh failure rate for reverts

    We have successfully resolved the issue affecting project revert functionality. Our team deployed a fix that restores it to a stable version, addressing the root cause of the failures. Users who experienced errors or missing progress when attempting to revert projects should now find these issues resolved. All revert operations are functioning normally. Thank you for your patience while we worked through this issue.

    Resolved

  3. LeverIntermittent issues impacting Lever Hire

    The issue where general opportunities were showing when archiving opportunities has been resolved. The incident occurred from February 10, 2026 at 1:00 PM PT to February 11, 2026 at 5:30 PM PT. There should be no further impact at this time, but please reach out to us at Support if any additional assistance is needed: https://help.lever.co/hc/en-us/requests/new

    Resolved

Feb 11, 2026

  1. GitHubDegraded performance for Copilot Coding Agent

    On February 9, 2026, between ~06:00 UTC and ~12:12 UTC, Copilot Coding Agent and related Copilot API endpoints experienced degraded availability. The primary impact was to agent-based workflows (requests to /agents/swe/*, including custom agent configuration checks), where 154k users saw failed requests and error responses in their editor/agent experience. Impact was concentrated among users and integrations actively using Copilot Coding Agent with VS Code. <br /><br />The degradation was caused by an unexpected surge in traffic to the related API endpoints that exceeded an internal secondary rate limit. That resulted in upstream request denials which were surfaced to users as elevated 500 errors.<br /><br />We mitigated the incident by deploying a change that increased the applicable rate limit for this traffic, which allowed requests to complete successfully and returned the service to normal operation.<br /><br />After the mitigation, we deployed guardrails with applicable caching to avoid a repeat of similar incidents. We also temporarily increased infrastructure capacity to better handle backlog recovery from the rate limiting. We're are improving monitoring around growing agentic API endpoints.

    Resolved

  2. NeonConnection latency in EU Central 1

    Between 13:00 UTC and 17:30 UTC February 11, 2026, customers may have experienced failures or delays in database connectivity. The issue has been fully resolved. All affected components are operating normally again.

    Resolved

  3. PlaidService Disruption Impact Chase Customers

    Chase is currently experiencing downtime impacting all channels and data recipients. Item adds and API calls through Plaid are impacted. We will provide an update when Chase has resolved the issue.

    Resolved

  4. HashiCorpIntermittent issues with HCP Terraform

    Our Engineering team has resolved the issue. These systems should now be operating normally. If you continue to experience any problems, please open a ticket with our support team.

    Resolved

  5. Webflow[RESOLVED] Reports of form notification emails not being delivered

    This incident has been resolved. Due to an issue with an upstream provider, Form submission notification emails were not processed as expected between 21:30 February 10th - 21:30 February 11th (UTC). Form submissions received during this time processed as expected, and remain available to review via the Forms tab in Site Settings. We sincerely apologize for any inconvenience this issue caused, and appreciate your understanding as we worked with our upstream provider to resolve this issue.

    Resolved

  6. MakeLogin Issues for New Users

    We have confirmed that the login issues are fully resolved and all systems are performing normally.

    Resolved

  7. GitHubIncident with Issues, Actions and Git Operations

    On February 9, 2026, GitHub experienced two related periods of degraded availability affecting GitHub.com, the GitHub API, GitHub Actions, Git operations, GitHub Copilot, and other services. The first period occurred between 16:12 UTC and 17:39 UTC, and the second between 18:53 UTC and 20:09 UTC. In total, users experienced approximately 2 hours and 43 minutes of degraded service across the two incidents. During both incidents, users encountered errors loading pages on GitHub.com, failures when pushing or pulling code over HTTPS, failures starting or completing GitHub Actions workflow runs, and errors using GitHub Copilot. Additional services including GitHub Issues, pull requests, webhooks, Dependabot, GitHub Pages, and GitHub Codespaces experienced intermittent errors. SSH-based Git operations were not affected during either incident. Our investigation determined that both incidents shared the same underlying cause: a configuration change to a user settings caching mechanism caused a large volume of cache rewrites to occur simultaneously. During the first incident, asynchronous rewrites overwhelmed a shared infrastructure component responsible for coordinating background work, triggering cascading failures. Increased load caused the service responsible for proxying Git operations over HTTPS to exhaust available connections, preventing it from accepting new requests. We mitigated this incident by disabling async cache rewrites and restarting the affected Git proxy service across multiple datacenters. An additional source of updates to the same cache circumvented our initial mitigations and caused the second incident. This generated a high volume of synchronous writes, causing replication delays that cascaded in a similar pattern and again exhausted the Git proxy’s connection capacity, degrading availability across multiple services. We mitigated by disabling the source of the cache rewrites and again restarting Git proxy. We know these incidents disrupted the workflows of millions of developers. While we have made substantial, long-term investments in how GitHub is built and operated to improve resilience, GitHub's availability is not yet meeting our expectations. Getting there requires deep architectural work that is already underway, as well as urgent, targeted improvements. We are taking the following immediate steps: 1. We have already optimized the caching mechanism to avoid write amplification and added self-throttling during bulk updates. 2. We are adding safeguards to ensure the caching mechanism responds more quickly to rollbacks and strengthening how changes to these caching systems are planned, validated, and rolled out with additional checks. 3. We are fixing the underlying cause of connection exhaustion in our Git HTTPS proxy layer so the proxy can recover from this failure mode automatically without requiring manual restarts. GitHub is critical infrastructure for your work, your teams, and your businesses. We're focusing on these mitigations and long-term infrastructure work so GitHub is available, at scale, when and where you need it.

    Resolved

  8. GitHubIncident with Pull Requests

    On February 9, 2026, GitHub experienced two related periods of degraded availability affecting GitHub.com, the GitHub API, GitHub Actions, Git operations, GitHub Copilot, and other services. The first period occurred between 16:12 UTC and 17:39 UTC, and the second between 18:53 UTC and 20:09 UTC. In total, users experienced approximately 2 hours and 43 minutes of degraded service across the two incidents. During both incidents, users encountered errors loading pages on GitHub.com, failures when pushing or pulling code over HTTPS, failures starting or completing GitHub Actions workflow runs, and errors using GitHub Copilot. Additional services including GitHub Issues, pull requests, webhooks, Dependabot, GitHub Pages, and GitHub Codespaces experienced intermittent errors. SSH-based Git operations were not affected during either incident. Our investigation determined that both incidents shared the same underlying cause: a configuration change to a user settings caching mechanism caused a large volume of cache rewrites to occur simultaneously. During the first incident, asynchronous rewrites overwhelmed a shared infrastructure component responsible for coordinating background work, triggering cascading failures. Increased load caused the service responsible for proxying Git operations over HTTPS to exhaust available connections, preventing it from accepting new requests. We mitigated this incident by disabling async cache rewrites and restarting the affected Git proxy service across multiple datacenters. An additional source of updates to the same cache circumvented our initial mitigations and caused the second incident. This generated a high volume of synchronous writes, causing replication delays that cascaded in a similar pattern and again exhausted the Git proxy’s connection capacity, degrading availability across multiple services. We mitigated by disabling the source of the cache rewrites and again restarting Git proxy. We know these incidents disrupted the workflows of millions of developers. While we have made substantial, long-term investments in how GitHub is built and operated to improve resilience, GitHub's availability is not yet meeting our expectations. Getting there requires deep architectural work that is already underway, as well as urgent, targeted improvements. We are taking the following immediate steps: 1. We have already optimized the caching mechanism to avoid write amplification and added self-throttling during bulk updates. 2. We are adding safeguards to ensure the caching mechanism responds more quickly to rollbacks and strengthening how changes to these caching systems are planned, validated, and rolled out with additional checks. 3. We are fixing the underlying cause of connection exhaustion in our Git HTTPS proxy layer so the proxy can recover from this failure mode automatically without requiring manual restarts. GitHub is critical infrastructure for your work, your teams, and your businesses. We're focusing on these mitigations and long-term infrastructure work so GitHub is available, at scale, when and where you need it.

    Resolved

Older incidents