ExpoEAS Outage
This incident has been resolved.
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Outages and recoveries from the services you depend on.
40 incidents
This incident has been resolved.
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We have fixed the issue and all apps should be fixed now that were experiencing issues loading data.
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Namespaces have been failed back to their primary region. This incident has been resolved
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The incident is resolved and account creation is now working.
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Campaign sending has been restored and the backlog of delayed campaigns has completed sending. This incident has been resolved.
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On June 4, 2026, from 17:30 UTC to 18:55 UTC, Copilot Code Review experienced elevated failures for review requests on GitHub.com. Affected users saw “Copilot ran into an error” on pull requests when requesting a code review.<br /><br />During the incident window, an average of 81.6% of Copilot Code Review requests failed, with a peak failure rate of 93.9%. Approximately 36,800 code review requests failed. GitHub Enterprise Cloud with data residency was not impacted.<br /><br />The issue was caused by a newly released dependency used by the Copilot Code Review processing workflow. The release introduced an incompatibility with the runtime environment. Because the workflow automatically consumed the latest release, the incompatible version was picked up without sufficient compatibility validation and caused review processing to fail.<br /><br />We mitigated the incident by removing the problematic dependency version and redeploying the affected processing service. New code reviews began recovering at 18:44 UTC, and the failure rate returned to baseline by 18:55 UTC. Remaining timed-out work drained by 19:59 UTC.<br /><br />To reduce the risk of recurrence, we are pinning the dependency version instead of automatically consuming the latest release, adding compatibility checks for future releases, improving fast-failure behavior when the review processor cannot start, adding shorter timeout controls for review workflows, and improving monitoring for review completion failures.
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Integration issue has been fixed.
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We worked with the third-party provider to resolve the integration issue, restoring API availability.
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We have identified the root cause and are planning on supplanting the mitigations with longer-term reliability fixes for this piece of logic
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Upgrade successfully resolved.
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This incident has been resolved, and the Airtable service is again operating normally. We apologize for any disruption this issue caused.
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This incident has been resolved.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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We scaled our infrastructure and are processing media uploads without errors.
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The issue affecting SMS-based two-factor authentication for users in EMEA has been resolved, and all services are now functioning as expected. We have adjusted configuration settings to restore normal service and will continue to monitor the situation to ensure stability. We apologize for how you and your business may have been affected by this. We will perform a full investigation of the incident, confirming the technical trigger, the underlying cause, and preventive action to avoid a repeat in the future.
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We haven't observed any additional issues with the Community Site, and will now consider this incident resolved. If you are still experiencing additional issues, please <a href="https://cloud.linode.com/support/tickets">open a Support ticket</a> for assistance.
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This issue is now resolved.
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Full functionality has been restored
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This incident has been resolved.
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The issue affecting Chatbots has been resolved. Between approximately 11:00 PM and 5:30 AM MST on June 8, 2026, some customers may have experienced failures or timeouts when initializing chats or interacting with embedded chatbots. The issue self-resolved and Chatbots has been operating normally since. Zap Runs and tasks were not affected. No data loss occurred. We are continuing to monitor the service and will take steps to reduce the likelihood of recurrence. If you experienced issues during this window or notice anything still not working, contact Support: https://zapier.com/app/get-help
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On May 25, 2026, between 09:02 UTC and 09:11 UTC, Git push operations over HTTPS and SSH experienced elevated failures. During this window, an average of 31% and a peak of 43% of push requests failed. The incident was caused by a recently enabled code path that issued an unexpectedly expensive database query against a primary database. The resulting load exhausted the database's connection pool, which caused the push failures above. The acute impact resolved automatically as in-flight work completed. We mitigated the incident by disabling the feature flag controlling the new code path. To prevent recurrence, we have updated the affected background workflows to route reads to replica databases instead of the primary, removing the specific code pattern that caused this incident; broader follow-up work is underway to apply the same safeguard to similar workflows across GitHub.
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This incident has been resolved.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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We've confirmed all sites are once again reachable. If you have any other questions, please reach out to our support team via chat, or by emailing us at support@kinsta.com.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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GitLab Credits dashboards are operating normally again. The issue has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved.
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Resolved We're closing this incident. On April 30, 2026 an attacker published malicious versions of intercom-client (v7.0.4) and intercom-php (v5.0.2). Both were removed from distribution within hours of discovery. No evidence of unauthorized access to customer data or Intercom accounts was found. If you installed intercom-client@7.0.4 or intercom-php@5.0.2 on April 30 and haven't already done so, we recommend rotating any credentials configured in that environment. All other versions of both packages are safe. We kept the incident open out of an abundance of caution while we completed credential rotation, hardened our infrastructure, and monitored closely for any follow-on activity. We're now satisfied it's fully remediated.
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Resolved We're closing this incident. On April 30, 2026 an attacker published malicious versions of intercom-client (v7.0.4) and intercom-php (v5.0.2). Both were removed from distribution within hours of discovery. No evidence of unauthorized access to customer data or Intercom accounts was found. If you installed intercom-client@7.0.4 or intercom-php@5.0.2 on April 30 and haven't already done so, we recommend rotating any credentials configured in that environment. All other versions of both packages are safe. We kept the incident open out of an abundance of caution while we completed credential rotation, hardened our infrastructure, and monitored closely for any follow-on activity. We're now satisfied it's fully remediated.
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Resolved We're closing this incident. On April 30, 2026 an attacker published malicious versions of intercom-client (v7.0.4) and intercom-php (v5.0.2). Both were removed from distribution within hours of discovery. No evidence of unauthorized access to customer data or Intercom accounts was found. If you installed intercom-client@7.0.4 or intercom-php@5.0.2 on April 30 and haven't already done so, we recommend rotating any credentials configured in that environment. All other versions of both packages are safe. We kept the incident open out of an abundance of caution while we completed credential rotation, hardened our infrastructure, and monitored closely for any follow-on activity. We're now satisfied it's fully remediated.
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Cloud tasks creation is now behaving correctly.
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This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience while we fixed this issue.
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Between 10:13 UTC and 10:22 UTC on May 29, 2026, customers using Object Storage \(OBJ\) in London experienced 5xx errors when trying to access content stored in that location. While attempting to isolate a separate packet loss issue, Akamai sequentially upgraded 2 pairs of routers. The first pair of routers was upgraded successfully, but due to human error the second router pair's upgrade command was executed before the first pair had completed route convergence. This resulted in a temporary loss of routing paths for OBJ traffic in the London datacenter. The issue was quickly detected via an automated alert, and service was restored automatically once the firmware upgrades and routing convergence completed. Akamai's Change Management Policy requires all router upgrade activities to be performed in accordance with established procedures and predefined implementation instructions. Akamai will conduct refresher training on the Change Management Policy to reinforce compliance with the required processes and ensure strict adherence going forward. This summary provides an overview of our current understanding of the incident given the information available. Our investigation is ongoing and any information herein is subject to change.
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The Buffer dashboard has remained stable during our monitoring period, and we are no longer observing any impact. This incident is now resolved. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused. Please let us know if you're still experiencing issues.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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All impacted services have now fully recovered.
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The issue has been resolved, and all services are operating normally.
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Incident Summary — Elevated Call Failure Rate on 9180 Number Series. Specific number series of 9180 were impacted for outbound calls. Incident Window: 5th June 2026, 6:30 PM IST — 6th June 11:30 AM IST Impact: Outbound calls to the 9180 number series were affected throughout the incident window. The failure rate reached approximately 34% at peak. Other number series and carrier paths were unaffected. The issue appeared to partially ease during low-traffic overnight hours but fully reasserted when business-hours call volumes resumed on the morning of 6 June. Resolution: Once issue was detected engineering team analysed the issue and resolved by replacing affected routing infrastructure. Issue was resolved by 6th June 11:30 AM.
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