IONOSLimited functionality of Support Tools
The issue has been resolved.
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Outages and recoveries from the services you depend on.
40 incidents
The issue has been resolved.
Resolved
Service has been fully restored to remaining affected areas. We will share further details on the cause.
Resolved
We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
Resolved
Test Insights reports are now available.
Resolved
The ATO has resolved the issue impacting AU customers trying to file tax returns in Xero Tax.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
**SUMMARY** On August 27, 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC, Atlassian customers in the Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions were unable to reach Atlassian Cloud products, including Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The event was triggered by a defective code change to the routing layer of one of our proxy fleets. This led to HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. The incident was detected within 1 minute by our automated monitoring systems, and mitigated by rolling back to the previous configuration release, which put the proxy fleet into a known good state. After the proxy fleet recovered, some Jira and Confluence customers (regardless of location) received HTTP 503 errors between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC as server fleets adjusted to the influx of traffic. **IMPACT** The overall impact was split into two discrete periods: - First, on 27 August 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC on Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The incident caused service disruption to customer traffic originating from Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions, with HTTP 404 errors returned. There was no impact to customer API traffic, regardless of origin location. - Second, on 27 August 2026, between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC, some Jira and Confluence customers regardless of location received HTTP 503 errors after the HTTP 404 errors were solved: ~32% of requests in ap-southeast-2, ~4% of requests in eu-west-1, ~2.5% of requests in us-west-2 and ap-southeast-1, and <1% of requests in all remaining global regions. **ROOT CAUSE** The event was triggered by a code change to one of our proxy fleets. However, there was a defect in the code deployed which was not detected by manual and automated testing. This led to a misconfiguration of a tenant lookup functionality in the proxy tier, which led to traffic not having a valid network path, resulting in HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. After the proxy tier impact recovered, a second period of impact was caused to some Jira and Confluence customers. Due to the reduction of traffic served to Jira and Confluence by the proxy fleet, the Jira and Confluence service tiers had automatically scaled in the number of servers serving customer traffic. Once the proxy fleet functionality was restored, the surge of traffic overwhelmed the Jira service tier, which returned an elevated rate of HTTP 503s until it automatically scaled out again. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn’t identified because the change was related to a very specific kind of edge case that was not picked up by our automated continuous deployment suites and manual test scripts. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help avoid repeating this type of incident: - **Adding further deployment safeguards:** The deployment pipeline for the configuration of the impacted proxy tier was using a legacy system and did not have the appropriate slow regional rollout features configured correctly. We have already added the correct safeguards, and we are moving this to our company standard deployment pipeline that includes all of our safety controls enabled by default. We are also auditing all networking services to validate that they are all on the new standard pipeline deployment service. - **Enhancing service fleet scaling policies:** The auto scaling configuration for our Jira and Confluence service fleets was configured to scale in too aggressively. We are thoroughly reviewing and updating all of the complex Jira and Confluence auto scaling policies to ensure that this doesn’t occur again. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support
Resolved
**SUMMARY** On August 27, 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC, Atlassian customers in the Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions were unable to reach Atlassian Cloud products, including Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The event was triggered by a defective code change to the routing layer of one of our proxy fleets. This led to HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. The incident was detected within 1 minute by our automated monitoring systems, and mitigated by rolling back to the previous configuration release, which put the proxy fleet into a known good state. After the proxy fleet recovered, some Jira and Confluence customers (regardless of location) received HTTP 503 errors between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC as server fleets adjusted to the influx of traffic. **IMPACT** The overall impact was split into two discrete periods: - First, on 27 August 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC on Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The incident caused service disruption to customer traffic originating from Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions, with HTTP 404 errors returned. There was no impact to customer API traffic, regardless of origin location. - Second, on 27 August 2026, between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC, some Jira and Confluence customers regardless of location received HTTP 503 errors after the HTTP 404 errors were solved: ~32% of requests in ap-southeast-2, ~4% of requests in eu-west-1, ~2.5% of requests in us-west-2 and ap-southeast-1, and <1% of requests in all remaining global regions. **ROOT CAUSE** The event was triggered by a code change to one of our proxy fleets. However, there was a defect in the code deployed which was not detected by manual and automated testing. This led to a misconfiguration of a tenant lookup functionality in the proxy tier, which led to traffic not having a valid network path, resulting in HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. After the proxy tier impact recovered, a second period of impact was caused to some Jira and Confluence customers. Due to the reduction of traffic served to Jira and Confluence by the proxy fleet, the Jira and Confluence service tiers had automatically scaled in the number of servers serving customer traffic. Once the proxy fleet functionality was restored, the surge of traffic overwhelmed the Jira service tier, which returned an elevated rate of HTTP 503s until it automatically scaled out again. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn’t identified because the change was related to a very specific kind of edge case that was not picked up by our automated continuous deployment suites and manual test scripts. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help avoid repeating this type of incident: - **Adding further deployment safeguards:** The deployment pipeline for the configuration of the impacted proxy tier was using a legacy system and did not have the appropriate slow regional rollout features configured correctly. We have already added the correct safeguards, and we are moving this to our company standard deployment pipeline that includes all of our safety controls enabled by default. We are also auditing all networking services to validate that they are all on the new standard pipeline deployment service. - **Enhancing service fleet scaling policies:** The auto scaling configuration for our Jira and Confluence service fleets was configured to scale in too aggressively. We are thoroughly reviewing and updating all of the complex Jira and Confluence auto scaling policies to ensure that this doesn’t occur again. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
We've resolved the issue and services are operating normally.
Resolved
This incident is now resolved. All sources in the Europe region are processing in real time and the delayed backlog has been processed in full. What happened: On September 3, we consolidated several EU Telemetry clusters onto new, higher-capacity infrastructure. The cutover multiplied concurrent write streams on the cluster, and the volume of concurrent inserts saturated per-host write throughput on I/O contention. Ingestion fell behind, and affected sources saw delays in Live tail, dashboards, alerts, and queries. Our initial fixes, tuning the write path and adding capacity, restored real-time ingestion within a day, but draining the backlog alongside live traffic re-created the contention. We then rebuilt the recovery pipeline and held live data with strict priority while separately replaying the backlog at a controlled rate. Replaying several days of data was the slowest part of the recovery by design, as we rate-limited the replay so that real-time ingestion wasn't put at risk. We know teams rely on this data to operate their own systems, and losing that visibility for days is serious. We are sorry, both for the disruption and for turning what we originally announced as 90-minute maintenance into a multi-day incident. The fixes we made here are permanent, and this kind of contention can't happen again. Thank you very much for your patience. Please reach out to [hello@betterstack.com](mailto:hello@betterstack.com) if you have any questions.
Resolved
The issue was resolved upstream, and the Warsaw region has been stable.
Resolved
We are pleased to inform you that the incident affecting our Containers & Orchestration offering has been resolved. <b>Start time :</b> 06/09/2026 09:00 UTC <b>End time :</b> 06/09/2026 10:45 UTC <b>Root Cause :</b> This incident was caused by a software issue. We apologize for any inconvenience caused and appreciate your understanding.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved and the affected services have been restored.
Resolved
The incident has been resolved. Apologies for the inconvenience. We will continue to monitor.
Resolved
Applied a fix for the problem, we’re monitoring the situation SumUp services have returned to normal. Our engineering team will monitor the situation to make sure the issue is solved. We’ll post current information here on our status page "status page": https://status.sumup.com.
Resolved
We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
Resolved
The incident is now fully resolved, all services are now up and stable.
Resolved
Upstream issue resolved
Resolved
We've identified an issue with database connectivity for Vitess databases in GCP. We've taken steps to resolve the issue and are making immediate improvements to address root-causes and detection. Databases connectivity is now restored.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
Normal levels of operation has been fully restored. Incident is now resolved and closed.
Resolved
The publishing issue with Google Business Profile has been fully resolved, and it’s functioning as expected again. If you encounter any further problems, please don’t hesitate to reach out to our team.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved, and service is operating normally again. Thanks for your patience.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
We’ve pushed out a fix/patch; but it turns out this was a longer blip from one of our upstream providers. We’ll be working on workarounds for this going forward.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This issue is now resolved.
Resolved
The US Central region is fully recovered now and the issue is now resolved.
Resolved
Error rates on the impacted volume endpoint have subsided. We will continue to monitor.
Resolved
Our Engineering team has resolved the issue with creating new VCS workspaces with the Bitbucket cloud provider. If you continue to experience any problems, please open a ticket with our support team.
Resolved
We can confirm that the issue was mitigated at 14:20 UTC on 4 September, 2026 and the service has resumed normal operation. Customers and partners can view additional details about the incident by logging in to: https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/feed/0D5a700001S7tYbCAJ or reaching out to Akamai Support. We apologize for the impact and thank you for your patience and continued support. We are committed to making continuous improvements to make our systems better and prevent a recurrence of this issue.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
After completing the monitoring stage, we have confirmed that STT latency has returned to baseline stability.
Resolved
The US Central region is now fully operational and this incident is now resolved.
Resolved
Blob has fully recovered. This incident has been resolved.
Resolved