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40 incidents

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Jul 26, 2024

  1. AblyAbly.com website and control API disruption

    The ably.com website, dashboard and control API are experiencing disruption, intermittently since 0749 UTC on 15 February. We are investigating and will post here with further updates. 15th Feb 09:03 AM We are still working to understand the root cause of this problem. We don't have an ETA for resolution yet. 15th Feb 09:39 AM We are contacting our upstream service providers to assist in investigation of this issue. We don't have an ETA for resolution yet. 15th Feb 10:15 AM We are migrating to a replacement database instance. We should be able to confirm shortly whether or not this will resolve the issue. 15th Feb 10:29 AM All services appear to be up and running again, but we will continue to monitor.

    Resolved

  2. AblyAbly.com website and control API disruption

    We have a recurrence of the issues earlier this morning and are investigating. Currently ably.com and the control API are slow to respond with increased error rates. 15th Feb 12:00 PM The ably.com site and control API are continuing to experience some disruption with elevated latencies and error rates. We are still trying to establish the root cause of the problem. 15th Feb 01:02 PM The service has been stable for ~30 minutes. We will continue to monitor and work to understand the root cause.

    Resolved

  3. AblyElevated 502 error rate 15:40 and 17:40 UTC

    Between 15:40 and 17:40 UTC, customers using the REST API directly may have observed 502 error responses. Our SDKs automatically retry 5xx responses to fallback endpoints, so customers using SDKs should not have noticed anything except increased latency due to the retries. The proximate cause was a faulty router deploy, we are actively investigating the root cause, and will be improving our alerting system, which should have caught this sooner. We apologise for any disruption.

    Resolved

  4. AblyIssues with unbatched webhook and other service integration creation and delivery

    We have received reports of issues with webhook creation and deliveries and are currently investigating. A rollback is currently in progress. We will provide a further update when we have further information. 3rd May 05:47 PM All delivery and creation issues are resolved. We are investigating the root cause. 5th May 10:38 AM We have identified the root cause and the issue is fully resolved. All webhook deliveries and rule creation operations are working as expected.

    Resolved

  5. AblyEU Only Endpoint Issues

    We are having issues with EU only endpoints and are currently investigating 10th Jul 12:07 PM We have identified the root cause and the issue is fully resolved. Ably EU routing is now working as expected. The root cause of the issue related to DNS records for our eu-central region and temporary disablement of our eu-west region. Ably EU routing DNS includes two sites, namely eu-west and eu-central. The eu-central DNS record was incorrect and when disabling our eu-west site, DNS records for EU regions thus did not return valid IP addresses resulting in service disruption. Clients using Ably's EU environment client option, and anyone with ATM DNS with EU-only routing enabled were affected. The issue has been rectified and EU only endpoints are now working.

    Resolved

  6. AblyProblems with US-only routing policies

    Customers using a US-only routing policy (eg environment="us") who would naturally have been routed to us-east-1 may be experiencing issues, we are investigating 19th Jul 11:04 AM This has now been resolved. The cause was incorrect DNS configuration for the US-only routing policy. We had taken the us-east-1 region down for maintenance; the command to do this updates all relevant routing policies, in this case while the global DNS routing policy was updated correctly, the US-only routing policy was not. We apologise for the inconvenience and will be taking steps to make sure this does not happen again. Ably SDKs will automatically retry any failed attempts to a fallback site, and this mechanism was still working as normal. So in most cases, the only customer-visible effect to those affected (those using a US-only routing policy who are nearer us-east-1 than us-east-2 or us-west-1) will have been higher latencies when establishing a connection or making a REST request.

    Resolved

  7. AblyTimeouts and High Latencies Across All Regions

    # Summary of incident affecting the Ably production service 1 September - investigation and conclusions ## Overview There was an incident affecting Ably production services on 1 September 2023, which impacted a significant fraction of connections to primary and fallback endpoints, for a total of 12 minutes from 1519 to 1531 \(all times UTC\). The problem arose as a result of a Distributed Denial of Service \(DDoS\) attack targeting the Ably default endpoint, which temporarily overloaded various elements of Ably's networking and request handling infrastructure. At the present state of the investigation we have a thorough understanding of the nature of the attack, its impact on the service, and the effectiveness of our mitigations at the time. We are still in the process of planning and implementing a number of future mitigations to ensure that we can better handle a range of attack scenarios should they arise in the future. However, we are deliberately limiting the detail we disclose about the nature of this specific attack and our available mitigations. ## Background Ably operates a number of production clusters for its service around the globe. There is a main production cluster that services the majority of customer accounts, plus a small number of dedicated clusters for specific accounts. Each of the clusters has a presence in multiple regions in a globally federated system. ## Access network, client connections and routing In each region, the frontend layer of the messaging system, which terminates subscriber connections and handles REST requests, consists of a group of endpoint instances, behind a mesh of routers/reverse proxies which are responsible for distributing connections and requests among available endpoint instances, and implement endpoint affinity for certain classes of requests. These routers are served by AWS NLB instances in each region. Clients typically connect to the Ably service using generic API hostnames \(ie \`rest.ably.io\` and \`realtime.ably.io\`\) which resolve to a CloudFront distribution. This in turn uses latency-based DNS resolution to route to the nearest available and healthy NLB \(which will usually be the nearest datacenter geographically\). Route53 health checking is able to route requests to more remote service endpoints in the case that the nearest is detected to be unhealthy. Certain Ably customers have dedicated endpoints for connection, which then each have a dedicated CloudFront distribution; in the majority of cases \(ie all except those customers using dedicated clusters\), these also route to the same multi-tenanted production cluster. ### System scaling During normal operations, each of the principal roles that make up a cluster - including frontends and routers as mentioned above - scale autonomously in response to load variations. This scaling takes place independently in each of the regions that the cluster is operating in. Autoscaling is configured using specific scaling thresholds and step scaling parameters to achieve a balance between operating efficiency, instantaneous capacity margin, and rapidity of scaling in response to load variations. In the case of a large and sudden load increase, for example, a capacity margin is available to absorb some load increase whilst additional capacity comes online. The rate at which new capacity can become effective is constrained by: * the time taken for new instances to be launched and initialised; * the absolute rate at which new instances are added. These factors mean that there are limits to the rate at which capacity is added in response to load spikes. When there is an abnormally severe load spike, there can be a period of time in which the cluster in a region is under-provisioned, which results in some fraction of requests being denied until the required capacity is in place. We can also manually trigger explicit scaling in order to increase available capacity at a rate beyond that which happens autonomously; this manual control is available as an intervention to handle certain disruption situations. ### As it happened In the description below all times are in UTC, on 2023-09-01. * At 1519 we were alerted by our endpoint monitoring that the realtime endpoint was unhealthy, followed by a large number of other service failure indications, affecting all regions, over the next two minutes. * It was immediately evident that frontend and router instances were overloaded, although the cause at this time was not identified. Autoscaling had already been triggered. * At 1524 explicit manual scaling was triggered to further double capacity in eu-central-1, followed immediately by all other regions. * At 1529, with the added capacity still insufficient to handle the external load, a further doubling of capacity was manually triggered in all regions. * At 1531, as all requested additional capacity came online, service was restored to normal. * The attack subsided some minutes later. * At 1550 a second attack was mounted, but this was absorbed without impact. ## Impact During the incident there was an impact both to new requests and connection attempts, and operations on existing connections. The success rate for new connection attempts dropped to a low of 71% at 1523, then steadily recovered to 100% by 1531. Operations on existing connections \(creating new attachments, and publishing on existing attachments\) were impacted, but less severely. New attachment success rates dropped to a low of 97.5% at 1525, and publish success rates \(again on existing connections\) dropped to a low of 98.5% at 1519. Customers using the default endpoint, or any dedicated endpoint that resolves to the main production cluster, were affected. Customers using a dedicated cluster were not affected. The investigation has identified a number of issues relating to the DDoS resilience of the Ably service. We will not be publicly sharing many details of the attack or remediations, except to say that this was a volumetric Layer 7 attack from a broad range of IPs. We have identified and are implementing a range of measures that will ensure that we are better able to accommodate this kind of attack in the future. ## Conclusion The service issues were the direct result of a DDoS attack and temporarily overloaded Ably's available capacity and degraded the available service for legitimate traffic. We have reviewed our response to this event and identified a number of mitigations that we expect will enable us to reduce or eliminate the impact of similar events in the future. We take service continuity very seriously, and this incident represents another opportunity to learn and improve the level of service we are committed to providing for our customers. We are sorry for the disruption that was experienced by some customers, and are committed to identifying and implementing remedial actions so that we address the risks from such attacks as much as possible in the future.

    Resolved

  8. Ablyably.com and support.ably.com down

    Heroku is currently experiencing issues and this is affecting our website (ably.com), customer dashboards, blog and CMS. Our realtime services are not affected by this issue at this time. Heroku's status incident is available at - https://status.heroku.com/incidents/2590 27th Sep 06:34 PM Heroku issues are still affecting parts of ably.com. Our marketing site is affected, however users can still login, signup, use the dashboard, control API and docs. 27th Sep 07:16 PM ably.com is back up after migrating to another Heroku region. We will continue to monitor the situation.

    Resolved

  9. AblyNetwork issues for reactor queues in us-east-1

    We're currently experiencing network timeouts for hosted reactor queues in the us-east-1 region, we are investigating. 28th Sep 09:01 PM Our team are continuing to investigate network timeouts for hosted reactor queues in the us-east-1 region. 28th Sep 10:03 PM We have deployed a change to work around ongoing networking issues affecting the queues service in us-east-1. As far as we can tell, this has been successful and service performance has returned to normal. We will continue to monitor the situation. 28th Sep 10:10 PM The service is performing normally.

    Resolved

  10. Ablyably.com website, blog and control API down

    The Ably website is unavailable, responding with 500 errors. We are currently investigating. 6th Oct 03:34 PM We are deploying a change that we expect will resolve the issue. 6th Oct 03:36 PM The ably.com site, blog and control API are back up.

    Resolved

  11. AblyElevated error rates in eu-central-1

    We've been alerted to slightly elevated error rates in eu-central-1 and are investigating. 20th Oct 04:14 AM The issue is resolved and service is back to normal.

    Resolved

  12. AblyPlanned maintenance for ably.com and control.ably.net

    On Tuesday 19th March at 08:00 UTC we performed backend maintenance for ably.com and control.ably.net which lasted 30 minutes. During this period these services were unavailable. This did not affect the realtime system. Please contact Ably support if you have any concerns, or about anything else relating to the Ably service.

    Resolved

  13. AblyIntermittent issues affecting ably.com

    We are currently investigating an issue affecting https://ably.com. Users may experience intermittent 500 errors. 19th Mar 02:30 PM We have taken mitigating actions and error rates have returned to normal levels.

    Resolved

  14. AblyElevated 5xx error rate for connection creation in us-east-1

    There was an elevated 5xx error rate for connection creation from the us-east-1 datacenter from 13:24-14:20 UTC, due to a broken router process, which was then removed from service. The error rate in that region peaked at 4%. No other regions were affected. Any customers using an Ably SDK will not have noticed anything other than potentially increased latencies, since Ably SDKs automatically retry to a fallback region on 5xx. However, customers in east coast or central US who are using SSE, or other protocols using our protocol translation functionality (such as mqtt, pusher, or pubnub), may have noticed some connection attempts fail with 5xx.

    Resolved

Jul 25, 2024

Jul 24, 2024

  1. UdemySite is degraded

    We have resolved the stability issue on our site, and performance is back to normal. We appreciate your patience.

    Resolved

  2. BitbucketPipelines failing to start.

    Between 2024-07-24 3.30am UTC to 2024-07-24 6.40am UTC, we experienced degraded performance with API and Pipelines for Atlassian Bitbucket. The issue has been resolved and the service is operating manually.

    Resolved

Jul 23, 2024

  1. AppsFlyerDashboards availability

    We're happy to report that the issue has been resolved and all dashboards and APIs are available. Thank you for your patience. If you're still experiencing any related issues, please reach out to customer support.

    Resolved

Jul 22, 2024

Jul 19, 2024

Jul 18, 2024

  1. TypeformTypeform Builder - Editing forms is affected

    We are glad to inform you that the fix has been implemented and the incident resolved. We will run a problem investigation to understand what happened and how to prevent it from happening again. Thanks for your understanding & sorry for any inconvenience this has caused.

    Resolved

Jul 17, 2024

Jul 16, 2024

  1. UdemySite is degraded

    We have resolved the stability issue on our site, and performance is back to normal. We appreciate your patience.

    Resolved

Jul 15, 2024

  1. AsanaAsana unreachable for some users

    Incident: On 2024-07-01 22:30 UTC, changes related to ongoing work towards smaller, independent deployment environments resulted in an invalid configuration affecting approximately 18% of our customers in our US datacenter. Resolution was delayed due to an unrelated issue with our infrastructure configuration management tools, but the impact was resolved for half of the affected users at 23:35 and for all affected users by 23:42. Impact: Affected customers were unable to open our application \(either with a web browser or with our desktop application\). Existing sessions worked, and no data was lost. Mobile and API were unaffected. Users in other data centers \(and ~82% of users in the US datacenter\) were unaffected by this event. Moving forward: We have done a retrospective analysis using the [5 Whys process](https://wavelength.asana.com/workstyle-ask-5-whys-to-get-to-the-root-of-any-problem/), and have identified bugs, process improvements, and monitoring improvements to avoid future downtime while rolling out more fine-grained deployment environments. Our metric considers a weighted average of uptime experienced by users at each data center. The number of minutes of downtime shown reflects this weighted average.

    Resolved

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