LinodeUpstream Issues - Ubuntu
We can confirm that the issue was mitigated at 06:30 UTC on August 20, 2026 and the service has resumed normal operations.
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Outages and recoveries from the services you depend on.
40 incidents
We can confirm that the issue was mitigated at 06:30 UTC on August 20, 2026 and the service has resumed normal operations.
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We have re-indexed the search and performance has improved. Please e-mail support@readme.com if you're still seeing issues with search
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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_Notice and disclaimer: Box is providing this preliminary information subject to further review and analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the current state and we may update as more information is confirmed._ On August 19, 2026 between 3:44pm PDT to 3:49pm PDT, some users may have experienced difficulties while working in Box. When attempting to access Box during this time, some users may have seen an error message. Preview, and Box Notes functionalities were impacted. This occurred because of an issue affecting Box’s critical third party cloud ingress services. We are conducting a full engineering postmortem in conjunction with our cloud provider, and our overview is subject to change with further analysis and findings. In the event our continuing investigation yields further substantive findings, we may publish additional analysis after the conclusion of the full engineering postmortem. We are continuously working to improve Box and want to make sure we are delivering the best product and user experience we can. We hope we have provided some clarity here and we would be happy to answer any questions you may still have regarding this matter. Sincerely, The Box Team
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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This issue has been resolved and users should no longer see elevated agent errors.
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The issue has been resolved.
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The elevated 403 errors affecting GitLab.com have been resolved and error rates have returned to normal levels. More details in: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-infra/production/-/work_items/22762
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved.
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Our Engineering team has confirmed that the issue impacting Container Registry and Spaces accessibility has been resolved. Spaces accessibility via the Cloud Control Panel is now restored, and pushing and pulling container images is succeeding as expected. Customers who previously encountered these issues should now be able to access Spaces and deploy their container images without further issues. If you continue to experience any problems, please open a ticket with our support team. Thank you for your patience, and we apologize for any inconvenience.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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After reviewing the impact, we’ve confirmed that this issue is limited in scope and does not affect core functionality. We’re closing this Statuspage update. Customers who continue to experience the issue should contact Support.
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Self-Signup onboarding was inadvertently restricted after a rollout, preventing users from completing Self-Signup onboarding. The configuration change occurred on August 20 at 21:21 UTC, and the issue was noticed at approximately 12:40 UTC on August 21. The issue was mitigated at 13:01 UTC by correcting the onboarding configuration. The onboarding configuration was corrected, and Self-Signup onboarding functionality has returned to normal.
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This incident has been resolved.
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Starting at 9:50 AM Central Time on July 31st we received alerts around querying health and latency. The cause was eventually tracked down to a clash of two different factors. First, we have been introducing Lambda Managed Instances \(LMI\) into our query architecture, which behave similar to classic lambdas in many ways and had been introduced as part of work around querying performance improvements with the goal of a better and faster user experience. Unfortunately, a difference between classic lambdas and LMIs we discovered is the 15 minute hard stop of classic lambdas does not exist on LMIs, which means that certain assumptions built into our querying system no longer held. At the time of the incident, our newer Canvas feature was running batches of queries for a customer which should have a self imposed one minute time out. This timeout was not properly communicated back to the lambda, and while with classic lambdas the task would automatically cut off at 15 minutes, the new LMIs were not enforcing this sort of safety mechanism. As a result, some large queries were running for up to 30 minutes, driving up query latency across the board and resulting in errors for users trying to run fresh queries. The system recovered by 10:10 AM CT, 20 minutes later, when the large queries cleared out, but we continued to investigate the cause of the incident. Once we identified this weakness in our querying architecture we began work to fix it and prevent the same incident from occurring again. We have shipped all associated incident follow ups.
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On August 13, 2026, between approximately 14:30 and 16:30 UTC, Akamai experienced an issue affecting Linode Kubernetes Engine Enterprise \(LKE-E\) cluster provisioning and deployment in the Seattle \(SEA1\) region. During this time, customers attempting to create new clusters encountered failures or delays. In some cases, clusters were created but nodes were not fully provisioned, while in others, the control plane responsible for managing the cluster could not be deployed. Akamai identified the issue through customer reports, which was then validated by reproducing the failures in Seattle-based test clusters. Other regions continued to operate normally, and no existing customer workloads were impacted. By around 16:30 UTC on August 13, 2026, cluster provisioning and deployment in the Seattle region returned to normal, allowing new cluster creations to proceed without issue. After recovery, we monitored the region for several days and began a technical investigation into the service disruption. Initial findings indicate a correlation between the issue and a recent network configuration update that occurred at approximately 14:30 UTC and was rolled back at approximately 14:45 UTC. Our current hypothesis suggests that a timing conflict during the cluster provisioning process may have triggered the failures. We are continuing to investigate the technical details to confirm the root cause. We are continuing to investigate the technical details behind this issue and are working to ensure it does not recur. We will also review the scope of affected data centers and track corrective actions. This summary provides an overview of our current understanding of the incident given the information available. Our investigation is ongoing and any information herein is subject to change.
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved. Remixing and creating projects with Lovable Cloud should be working normally again.
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This incident has been resolved and the affected services have been restored.
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On 21st Aug 2026, between 04:26 UTC and 09:33 UTC, some users may have experienced issues with macros not rendering correctly in Confluence. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all customers.
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved.
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# **Summary** Between 25 July and 4 August 2026, pipeline execution dashboards and overview pages in the Harness Prod 2 and Prod 3 clusters displayed data that was between behind real time. Pipelines themselves continued to build, deploy, and execute normally throughout; the issue was confined to how quickly execution records were copied into the database that serves reporting and dashboard views. **No customer data was lost.** Every affected record remained durably stored and was replayed into the analytics datastore once the underlying limitation was removed. Harness migrated the affected clusters to a horizontally scalable, queue-backed version of the replication component on 1 August 2026 and completed targeted data backfills for all affected accounts. # **Root cause** Harness maintains a change-data-capture component that continuously replicates pipeline execution records from the primary operational datastore into a separate time-series datastore optimised for dashboards and reporting queries. Dashboards read exclusively from the analytics datastore. When replication falls behind, dashboards render an accurate but older view of the world, while execution itself is unaffected. This was caused by sharp, sustained increase in database write volume from another Harness platform module sharing the same replication path exceeded the throughput ceiling of the older, single-instance version of that component still running in Prod 2 and Prod 3. A backlog formed and grew. # **Preventive actions** Harness has completed or committed to the following actions to prevent such issues. | **Action** | | --- | | Fine tune the replication lag alerting so that any delay beyond a defined threshold is notified | | Add a replication lag panel to the standard platform monitoring board so pipeline health is visible to on-call by default | | Reduce write amplification from co-tenant modules through per-module rate limiting or entity filtering on the replication stream |
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This incident has been resolved, and service is operating normally again. Thanks for your patience.
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident is resolved. Images with the fix are out: 4.0.12-stable 4.43.0-edge Our minimum release age for React app builder dependencies is 5 days, so this incident will self-resolve for any self-hosted deployments that don't upgrade on August 24th, by 7am PST. All currently affected self-hosted versions: stable: 4.0.0 - 4.0.11 edge: 4.1, 4.9, 4.16, 4.19, 4.23, 4.27, 4.31, 4.35, 4.40
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Systems are back to normal
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This issue has been resolved.
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Run history delay has caught up and the incident is now resolved.
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved. The root cause has been identified and addressed. Customer workloads were not impacted during this incident.
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This incident has been resolved.
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We're all set! PandaDoc is working properly and the incident has been fully resolved. If you continue to experience issues with this, please contact our Support team (https://support.pandadoc.com/en/articles/9715061-how-to-contact-pandadoc-support).
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We are currently investing this issue.
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Resolved. Google Cloud fully resolved the underlying Compute Engine incident at 12:37 PDT and all sandbox operations in the US region are back to normal.
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This incident has been resolved.
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The GCP issues in us-west1 region have been mitigated. Confluent services are no longer seeing any impact based on our monitoring.
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A BGP configuration error caused our Anycast DNS to route to some nodes without the proper DNS infrastructure. The issue was temporary and was resolved as soon as we removed that node from BGP.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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