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Oct 12, 2026

  1. CircleCIDelay in data appearing in UI and API

    ## Summary Between 11:15 UTC and 23:47 UTC on October 9, CircleCI customers experienced hours-long delays and failures across pipelines, workflows and jobs, along with delays in the CircleCI UI, API and notifications. * From 11:15 to 13:00 UTC, pipelines were created but not processed, and outbound webhooks and Slack and email notifications were not sent. * From 13:00 to 14:40 UTC, workflows and jobs started with delays while we worked through the backlog. * From 15:15 to 20:48 UTC, workflows and jobs started with increasing delays, of up to about an hour, and the CircleCI UI and API fell behind by up to about 2 hours. During this time, some jobs failed to start and some in-progress workflows failed. * From 20:48 to 22:10 UTC, we temporarily paused starting new workflows and jobs so our systems could recover. New pipelines were accepted and queued during this time. * From 22:10 to 23:47 UTC, queued workflows and jobs resumed and were successfully processed. Some of them had waited up to about 2 hours. * By 23:47, the incident was mitigated. The status page for this incident can be found at [October 9 - Delay in data appearing in UI and API](https://status.circleci.com/incidents/6cfhhlr4rmm0). Customers experienced a similar incident earlier in the week at [October 6 - Delays in pipelines, workflows, UI data, and notifications](https://status.circleci.com/incidents/z4hbq8h49j8c). Multiple CircleCI services use Temporal backed by Postgres as a reliable queueing mechanism, and both incidents had the same cause: the rate of writes to Temporal's Postgres instance were faster than Postgres’s transaction log could archive those writes. In both cases, this caused multi-hour delays in processing both pipelines and status notifications. We evaluated several mitigations, then paused new workflow starts so the system could recover safely, and ramped back up gradually. We then throttled work back up until our systems returned to normal. To permanently resolve the bottleneck, we have split work across multiple Temporal instances, each with its own independent database and worker clusters, and we load-balance across them. We had already scheduled infrastructure work starting the week of October 12 that would have removed this exact bottleneck and prevented these incidents. So starting 19:11 on October 9 our engineering team implemented, tested, and rolled out a simpler version of these changes within a few hours. We further added new alerting and tuned the underlying databases for better performance under high load. Customers whose jobs failed during this window may rerun them. ## Background To run customer jobs, CircleCI executes a series of steps: we accept customer pipelines; we assign jobs for those pipelines to workers; we deliver status updates for those pipelines and jobs; and we charge customers for the credits those jobs consume. Each of these steps is implemented by an independent service, with reliable queues in between. Historically we have implemented these reliable queues with RabbitMQ on top of durable storage, with exponential backoff and dead letter queues for reliability. Over the last year, we have increasingly reimplemented our reliable queues on [Temporal](https://temporal.io/), which provides far better durability and reliability guarantees over a simpler and more powerful programming model. Our build service \(which turns a pipeline config into an executable plan\), our workflow orchestrator service \(which distributes tasks onto workers\), our notification service \(which delivers status updates\), and our charging service \(which charges customers for credits\) all now use Temporal. Temporal stores the state for its workflows and activities \(called “history”\) in a database, and this is the only component in a Temporal instance that is synchronous and stateful. As a consequence, a Temporal instance’s ability to accept and execute workflows is dependent on the write rate of its backing database. We have also configured Temporal to delete completed workflows and activities from its history 3 days after they complete. At the time of this incident, we used a single clustered Temporal instance backed by a Multi-AZ Postgres RDS instance for all of these reliable queues. While a Multi-AZ RDS instance is resilient to zone failures, it maintains database consistency via a single write-ahead-log \(WAL\). At the time we had configured our Postgres instance to store its WAL on a Dedicated Log Volume \(DLV\) so log writes did not compete with data writes. The database archives the log continuously to backup storage, and it can only reuse space on the volume after the log has been archived. If the database writes logs faster than it archives, the volume fills and Postgres has no space to the write its WAL log. Then the database stops accepting incoming writes and goes entirely read-only. An RDS DLV is limited to 1TB of storage and 3000 IOPS and per AWS these limits are hardcoded and cannot be increased. ## What Happened _\(All times UTC\)_ One of the contributing factors to the October 6 incident was that we were processing a high rate of Temporal history deletions at the same time as incoming work, which in turn put pressure on the backing database. To resolve the October 6 incident, we changed cleanup settings on Temporal’s largest tables and moved the transaction log back to its dedicated volume. These changes eliminated the major source of transaction log writes, but did not consider the additional log writes from scheduled deletions. Because we have configured Temporal to delete completed workflows and activities from its history 3 days after they complete, the October 6 history was scheduled to be deleted on October 9. Starting at 08:00 on October 9, Temporal began processing those scheduled deletions, and as a consequence free space on the Postgres DLV began dropping precipitously, from 0.8TB at 08:00 to 0.1TB by 10:10. Our monitoring alerted at 10:28 and we declared an incident at 10:31. While our infrastructure team was investigating, at 11:15 the DLV ran out of space and the Postgres instance went read-only. This stopped all Temporal processing in its tracks. At 11:42, we restarted Postgres to move the WAL log from the DLV onto the data volume and use the spare disk space and IOPS there. This maneuver had mitigated the incident on October 6, and we knew it would take roughly 60 minutes. While the database was restarting, we began implementing several load-shedding techniques upstream of Temporal: * We began investigating whether we should shed incoming workloads altogether to keep the rest moving, but ultimately decided that this would provide no value. * At 12:29, we flagged off credit charging updates, which represented 12% of Temporal activities. This left the Pipeline Usage page with stale charging data, until we would backfill it, but would not lose data or prevent pipelines from running. At 12:59, the database was back up and began processing work that had queued since 11:15 and by 14:40, this backlog had cleared and jobs were starting on time. However, by 15:15, delays returned as database’s routing cleanup had fallen far behind on the tables Temporal uses to track queued and scheduled work. Those tables normally hold tens of thousands of deleted rows awaiting cleanup, but by late afternoon, they held tens of millions of rows. Every Temporal operation had to read past those rows, so the database spent much more processing time on each one and Temporal ran slower. This resulted in customers continuing to see hour-long delays in starting pipelines and in status updates. For the next several hours we attempted various mitigations, including: * Manipulating Temporal configuration values to reduce database pressure. This had minimal effect. * Running manual vacuum jobs to clean up dead rows in Postgres. This ended up competing for CPU with queries themselves, and was ultimately counterproductive. We cancelled them at 17:45 to relieve the pressure on the database load. * We began trying to move all of the notification usecases to a separate Temporal instance. This represented 18% of Temporal activities. We successfully finished moving notifications by 17:07. * At 17:16, we successfully implemented an optimization in our representation of pipeline state, which reduced it by 5%. That in turn reduced the size of database writes and therefore data pressure on the Postgres WAL log. None of these fully mitigated the issue. By 20:48, we realized that Postgres was now thrashing on database CPU and was no longer bottlenecked on log writes. We further realized that our upstream systems were both submitting new work and also retrying work that had earlier been submitted and failed. Recognizing that we were in a classic retry storm, we paused all incoming and retry work and let it queue up, in order to allow the database to fully complete in-process work. We then slowly throttled up queued work from 22:07 to keep the database at a sustainable load. This fully succeeded by 23:47 when all queued work had started, and we closed the incident at 02:08 on October 10. ## Future Prevention and Process Improvement ### Multiple Temporal Instances In parallel with incident mitigation and resolution, starting at 19:11 on October 9, we also began standing up multiple sharded Temporal instances and implementing the ability to load-balance incoming work between them. Each of the multiple Temporal instances maintains its own independent database and worker clusters, and so is isolated from the others. As a postmortem action item from the October 6 incident, we had already scheduled infrastructure work that would have removed the bottleneck of a single Temporal instance and Postgres database, starting October 12 and expecting to take 2 weeks. On October 9, we realized that this work simply could not wait, so our engineering team implemented, tested, and rolled out a simpler version of the planned changes within a few hours. These changes completed successfully at 01:45 on October 10. **In addition, we are changing how we store and monitor transaction logs.** Our Temporal database no longer uses the fixed-size log volume. We are adding alerts on how far log archiving falls behind and how fast the database writes logs, so we can act hours earlier than we did on October 9. **We are also revisiting the Temporal's deletion schedule.** Temporal deletes finished work a few days after it runs, so a busy day returns as database load later in the week. We are changing when and how quickly those deletions run. **We are changing how our systems retry when Temporal is slow.** On October 9, our systems retried failed work against Temporal and added to its load. As we committed after the October 6 incident, we are changing our systems to wait for Temporal to recover so work is not dropped. ## Conclusion Customer experience is our top priority, and we commit to continually improving the reliability of our systems to match the trust that our customers place in us. We thank our customers for their patience while our team worked to resolve these incidents. Please reach out to our support team with any questions or concerns.

    Resolved

  2. CloudflareNetwork Performance Issues in Seattle

    Between 12:54 and 21:06 UTC on October 12, 2026, Cloudflare experienced an issue that affected network performance in Seattle. During this time, customers may have experienced degraded network performance. This incident has been resolved.

    Resolved

  3. LambdaExperiencing issues with instance launches/terminations in us-west-1

    Severity Level: High Instance launches and terminations in us-west-1 are now operational. Thank you for your patience and understanding during this time. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the event you’re unsure as to whether your service is impacted by this incident, please open a support ticket. We’ll get back to you as soon as possible. • https://support.lambdalabs.com/hc/en-us/requests/new To be automatically notified when the status of this incident changes, please click on the “Subscribe to updates” button.

    Resolved

  4. CloudsmithIntermittent 503 Errors on Download Requests

    This incident is now resolved. Between 14:40 UTC and 18:53 UTC on 12 October 2026, some users may have experienced intermittent HTTP 503 errors affecting package downloads. We have applied a fix, and after monitoring, we confirmed normal operation for download requests.

    Resolved

  5. GitHubIncident with Git Operations, Pull Requests and Actions

    On October 7, 2026, GitHub had two outages of write operations with the same cause, totaling about 19 minutes. The first ran from 15:06 to 15:16 UTC (about 10 minutes) and the second from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC (about 9 minutes). In both windows, actions that save or change data failed across Git operations, pull requests, issues, GitHub Actions, the API, webhooks, sign-in and authentication, GitHub Apps and OAuth, code scanning, Codespaces, and Copilot. Reading data was largely unaffected. In the first outage, 5.6% of all web and API requests failed, peaking at 8.9%, and more than 12,000 organizations saw failed requests. Up to 26% of Git authentication requests failed, and 17% of Actions workflow runs failed with infrastructure errors. In the second outage, 6.2% of web and API requests failed, peaking at 9.3%, and more than 11,000 organizations were affected. Up to 25% of Git authentication requests failed, and 19% of Actions workflow runs failed. No databases experienced data loss, and operations retried after recovery succeeded. GitHub relies on an internal service that keeps track of which database servers should receive new and updated data. While replacing machines that run this service as part of regular maintenance, one of the new machines started with an outdated copy of its records, which still listed database servers we had already retired. When this node came online, it incorrectly modified routing configuration with the outdated records, routing write requests to non-existent database servers. Each outage ended when one of our established machines with correct configuration became the leader of the quorum and sent the correct configuration. After the first outage, we identified the new machine as the source and paused automated maintenance to stop it from being leader again. At 16:52 UTC, an automated maintenance task that did not honor the pause put it back in charge, and the outage happened again. We shut that machine down at 17:02 UTC and have since removed it, and the automation now honors the pause, which was a new regression due to an update of our puppet infrastructure. To prevent recurrence, we are clearing retired database servers from the service's records before any new machine is added, and we are keeping new machines from being elected leader until their records have been checked. We are also changing our systems to reject configuration that point to servers that don't exist and to keep using the last known-good settings instead. Finally, we are giving responders a faster way to take a misbehaving machine out of service, and adding alerts so changes like this are spotted within seconds. We will share a more detailed write-up of these incidents in our monthly availability report, along with the status of the repairs we are making to prevent issues like these in the future.

    Resolved

  6. GitHubIncident with Git Operations, Issues, Actions and Pull Requests

    On October 7, 2026, from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC, GitHub experienced a recurrence of the write-operation outage from earlier that day. Both outages shared the same root cause. Please refer to the combined summary covering both incidents, their impact, and our prevention measures: https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/djlmxz2zd0j7

    Resolved

  7. GroqModel Performance or Availability Issue

    The issues affecting minimaxai/minimax-m2.7 have been resolved. The model is operating normally. Root cause: hardware connectivity issues. We apologize for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

    Resolved

  8. GitHubSeveral services are degraded

    On October 6, 2026, from 19:44 to 19:50 UTC, GitHub experienced a service outage with elevated error rates peaking at 1.30% of all requests, totaling approximately 1.16 million failed requests. This impacted 12 services across GitHub, including Pull Requests, Webhooks, Repos, OAuth, Git over SSH, Codespaces, and Gists. The incident was triggered by GitHub Enterprise Importer (GEI) making multiple, long duration queries which saturated a database connection pool. Recovery was seen at approximately 19:50 UTC once the migration's calls stopped; GEI migrations were reenabled at 23:32 UTC after a code fix was merged.<br /><br />We have completed a detailed root-cause review and are implementing improved database-health safeguards. We will continue to review and add additional safeguards to prevent future recurrence.

    Resolved

  9. Liquid WebPBE Webmail Access Issues

    Our email vendor has confirmed that the issues affecting webmail login have now been resolved. If you have any further questions or concerns, please don’t hesitate to contact us via a support case or Live Chat.

    Resolved

  10. Vapidocs.vapi.ai is unavailable

    The issue has been resolved upstream and documentation is available once again, we'll continue monitoring to ensure stability.

    Resolved

  11. SlackSlack for iOS closing unexpectedly when opening channels

    We've rolled out an updated version of the Slack iOS app to all impacted customers. Channels now open without the app closing unexpectedly. Users who are still experiencing this issue should update the Slack IOS app from the app store Store to resolve it. We apologize for the inconvenience and thank you for your patience.

    Resolved

  12. GrafanaElevated Errors Ingesting Metrics in AWS US East (VA)

    From 09:45 UTC on 2026-10-12, customers in AWS US East (VA) experienced failed or delayed metric writes to Grafana Cloud Metrics, which may have also affected Frontend Observability and Synthetic Monitoring data in that region. This has been fully resolved and all services are operating normally again.

    Resolved

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