BasetenIntermittent 5xx for a subset of models in 1 US Central cluster
This incident has been resolved.
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Outages and recoveries from the services you depend on.
40 incidents
This incident has been resolved.
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All impacted services have now fully recovered.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved. Service has returned to normal operation, and we are no longer seeing elevated error rates.
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved. Between 16:40 UTC and 17:36 UTC, webhook events were delivered with delays averaging around 5 minutes, with some events delayed up to 15 minutes. Video processing, playback, and API requests were unaffected, and no events were lost — all delayed webhooks have been delivered.The underlying issue in one of our internal database clusters has been addressed, and delivery times have been stable since 17:36 UTC. We apologize for the disruption.
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On September 21, 2026, starting at approximately 16:10 UTC, Akamai observed degraded DNS resolution performance affecting a subset of Linode instances within the London \(`LON1`\) region. Platform-wide DNS resolution remained functional, and no other regions were affected. The disruption occurred during a drive transplant of a compute host at the London \(lon1\) data center, which temporarily took a customer-facing DNS resolver offline. Due to a software logic flaw, customer workload configurations deployed in the last year across the region were disproportionately reliant on this single resolver, causing DNS failures when it became unavailable. At 21:45 UTC, engineering teams deployed an emergency configuration update to rebalance and reorder active DNS resolver assignments in the region, returning DNS query performance to baseline levels. Post-remediation monitoring confirmed stable operations across `LON1`. Long-term engineering updates are currently being deployed to ensure provisioning utilities dynamically assign distinct, active DNS resolvers across all regions to prevent recurrence. This summary reflects our current understanding of the incident based on available details. Our investigation remains ongoing, and findings may be updated as further information is reviewed.
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This incident has been resolved.
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A subset of customers may have faced UI errors in the Packages page, the problem was detected and mitigated in realtime.
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident is resolved
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The issue has been resolved.
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On September 24th 2026, some Jira and JSM users in the US region may have experienced a performance degradation impacting Jira issue creation, issue viewing, and board loading. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.
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This incident has been resolved
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This incident has been resolved and the affected services have been restored.
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This incident has been resolved.
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Ghost email delivery was impacted by abuse of Ghost's email sending system. We've addressed the root cause and have taken action to remediate. Newsletter sending for sites with a custom sending domain has not been affected.
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This incident has been resolved. Administrative operations in the Supabase Dashboard are completing as expected, and we have observed no further permission related errors following the fix.
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On Sept 24th, 2026, between 07:28 to 08:08 UTC, some Jira users may have experienced errors or degraded performance when accessing Jira and viewing issues. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all customers.
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This incident has now been resolved - Customers with BYOIP addresses were unable to update their BGP prefixes, including advertising or withdrawing prefixes. Customers making changes to their address maps may also have experienced delays.
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Storage is now operating normally. We apologise for the disruption. Hardening measures are being put in place to prevent recurrence and will be communicated upon completion.
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We can confirm that the issue was mitigated at 22:45 UTC on September 23, 2026 and the service has resumed normal operation. Customers and partners can view additional details about the incident by logging in to: https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/feed/0D5a700001VNuHQCA1 or reaching out to Akamai Support. We apologize for the impact and thank you for your patience and continued support. We are committed to making continuous improvements to make our systems better and prevent a recurrence of this issue.
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We would like to inform you that the incident affecting our Block Storage offering has now been resolved. Please find the details of this incident below : <b>Start time :</b> 24/09/2026 08:25 UTC <b>End time :</b> 24/09/2026 09:11 UTC <b>Root Cause :</b> A service disruption occurred due to an unexpected underlying infrastructure malfunction. We thank you for your understanding and patience throughout this incident.
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Remediation was applied and we don't see signs of degradation anymore. Team will continue monitoring and investigating the root cause.
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All stuck pipes were resumed. ClickHouse team will continue monitoring and identifying the root cause to prevent similar issues in future.
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The latest version of rescue operator was not deployed to the nl-ams and fr-par regions following the latest changes to the already-deployed Provisioner. This caused installation issues for both Linux and ESXi operating systems.
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved.
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Impact From about 12:00 to 13:05 UTC, some clients got connection timeouts to their Redis databases. Affected were databases hosted in fra or gig, and clients whose connections were routed through fra or gig, even if their database is hosted in another region. What happened During a planned rolling upgrade, replicas in fra and gig did not finish draining and were left out of service. They were returned to Fly routing before they were ready to accept connections. Connections routed to them then timed out. What we're changing • We will be adding tooling to return a replica to service safely after maintenance. • We will be adding safety checks to our upgrade process. • We will make the upgrade procedure more resilient to errors like this one.
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Our team has resolved an issue impacting our customers globally over the past 3 minutes from 2:17pm-2:19pm AEST where there was some latency using Payroll, Invoicing and Contacts We apologise for any inconvenience this has caused.
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This incident has been resolved. https://x.com/discord/status/2102964092189475028?s=20
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved.
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This incident has been resolved and the affected services have been restored.
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This incident has been resolved.
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