AxiomIncreased ingest error rate
This incident is resolved
Resolved
Outages and recoveries from the services you depend on.
40 incidents
This incident is resolved
Resolved
On March 3, 2026, between 18:46 UTC and 20:09 UTC, GitHub experienced a period of degraded availability impacting GitHub.com, the GitHub API, GitHub Actions, Git operations, GitHub Copilot, and other dependent services. At the peak of the incident, GitHub.com request failures reached approximately 40%. During the same period, approximately 43% of GitHub API requests failed. Git operations over HTTP had an error rate of approximately 6%, while SSH was not impacted. GitHub Copilot requests had an error rate of approximately 21%. GitHub Actions experienced less than 1% impact. <br /><br />This incident shared the same underlying cause as an incident in early February where we saw a large volume of writes to the user settings caching mechanism. While deploying a change to reduce the burden of these writes, a bug caused every user’s cache to expire, get recalculated, and get rewritten. The increased load caused replication delays that cascaded down to all affected services. We mitigated this issue by immediately rolling back the faulty deployment. <br /><br />We understand these incidents disrupted the workflows of developers. While we have made substantial, long-term investments in how GitHub is built and operated to improve resilience, we acknowledge we have more work to do. Getting there requires deep architectural work that is already underway, as well as urgent, targeted improvements. We are taking the following immediate steps: <br /><br />- We have added a killswitch and improved monitoring to the caching mechanism to ensure we are notified before there is user impact and can respond swiftly. <br />- We are moving the cache mechanism to a dedicated host, ensuring that any future issues will solely affect services that rely on it.
Resolved
As there is no current impact, we are setting this incide to Resolved. We have identified the problematic behavior behind it and are working on a long-term fix. However, we know this defect can reoccur under certain high‑concurrency conditions. See https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-infra/production/-/work_items/21462 for details.
Resolved
The issues affecting service connectivity have been resolved. Following a coordinated effort with our infrastructure partners, all systems are now fully operational and performing as expected
Resolved
Deploys are succeeding.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
Our Engineering team has decided to close this incident, as the root cause appears to be Claude's handling of MCP tool calls with Cowork. We have notified the Anthropic team of the issue and will continue working with their Support and Engineering teams to help resolve it. If you're still running into issues or have questions, we recommend reaching out to Anthropic support by using this Help Center guide: https://support.claude.com/en/articles/9015913-how-to-get-support
Resolved
_Notice and disclaimer: Box is providing this preliminary information subject to further review and analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the current state and we may update as more information is confirmed._ On February 25, 2026 between 4:45 am PST and 5:40 am PST, some users may have experienced difficulties while working in Box. During this time, customers of Box Zones UK may have had issues with uploading, downloading, and previewing files. The issue occurred when some instances of a backend service in the impacted region ran into memory pressure. We resolved the issue by temporarily redirecting certain compute processes from the impacted region to the US region. Of note, even during the period of temporary traffic redirection, all Box Zones customer content continued to be stored in the correct Box Zones region. We are conducting a full engineering postmortem and our overview is subject to change with further analysis. In the event our continuing investigation yields further substantive findings, we may publish additional analysis after the conclusion of the full engineering postmortem. We are continuously working to improve Box and want to make sure we are delivering the best product and user experience we can. We hope we have provided some clarity here and we would be happy to answer any questions you may still have regarding this matter. Sincerely, The Box Team
Resolved
We recently addressed issues affecting Box FTP and SFTP services. We would like to take the opportunity to further explain these issues and the steps we have taken to keep them from happening in the future. From February 25th, 2026 at 9:20 AM PST to February 27th at 4:10 PM PST, some users may have experienced difficulties while working in Box. During this time, Box FTP and SFTP users may have seen CAPTCHA messages while logging in through FTP. The issue occurred due to a change in internal traffic routing which affected the Box FTP and SFTP services. We were able to resolve the issue by reverting the internal routing change and clearing CAPTCHAs for affected users. We are now working to harden the system against internal rate limiting going forward to prevent similar issues from occurring in the future. **Analysis** On February 23rd at 8:20 AM PST, a change was made to send a subset of login traffic through a new route. After this change, no issues were observed and no customer issues were reported. On February 25th at 8:20 AM PST, a subsequent change was made to send more of the same login traffic through the new route. Roughly one hour after this change was completed, the Box FTP service started to receive an increased rate of CAPTCHA failures, blocking users from logging in. The second routing change was identified as the root cause and reverted on February 27th at 12:49 PM PST. After revert, a number of Box FTP users needed to clear an additional CAPTCHA. Box Support assisted in clearing the CAPTCHAs manually and by 4:10 PM PST, all Box FTP and SFTP login errors were resolved. Our analysis determined that the root cause of this issue was a service that was added to the call stack in the new route. The service in question did not properly communicate rate limiting information sent by the Box FTP service. This led to Box FTP being internally rate limited, which prompted users to improperly complete a CAPTCHA when logging in to Box FTP. **Corrective Actions** Box has initiated the following corrective actions: * The service in question has been fixed to properly forward required rate limiting information. * We are implementing enhanced monitoring to enable faster responses in the case of similar occurrences. * A comprehensive review is being performed to find any instances of missing rate limiting information within the stack. We are continuously working to improve Box and want to make sure we are delivering the best product and user experience we can. We hope we have provided some clarity here and we would be happy to answer any questions you may still have regarding this matter. Sincerely, The Box Team
Resolved
_Notice and disclaimer: Box is providing this preliminary information subject to further review and analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the current state and we may update as more information is confirmed._ On February 24, 2026 between 1:15 PM PST and 3:59 PM PST, some users may have experienced difficulties while working in Box. The most significant impact occurred from 1:42 PM PST to 1:59 PM PST, when Uploads, Downloads, Logins, APIs, and Notes saw elevated latency and errors. A small subset of functionality continued to experience some degradation through 3:59 PM PST. The issue occurred due to our cache cluster becoming temporarily overloaded due to a traffic spike concentrated on a single hot key. We were able to resolve the majority of the impact by rate limiting peripheral workloads and fully resolve the issue by stopping the offending traffic source. We are now implementing automated hot key detection and introducing dynamic rate limiting at the caching layer to prevent similar issues from occurring in the future. We are conducting a full engineering postmortem and our overview is subject to change with further analysis and findings. In the event our continuing investigation yields further substantive findings, we may publish additional analysis after the conclusion of the full engineering postmortem. We are continuously working to improve Box and want to make sure we are delivering the best product and user experience we can. We hope we have provided some clarity here and we would be happy to answer any questions you may still have regarding this matter. Sincerely, The Box Team
Resolved
All impacted services have now fully recovered.
Resolved
Between February 26, 2026 UTC and February 27, 2026 UTC, customers hitting the webhooks delivery API may have experienced higher latency or failed requests. During the impact window, 0.82% of requests took longer than 3s and 0.004% resulted in a 500 error response.<br /><br />Our monitors caught the impact on the individual backing data source, and we were able to attribute the degradation to a noisy neighbor effect due requests to a specific webhook generating excessive load on the API. The incident was mitigated once traffic from the specific hook decreased.<br /><br />We have since added a rate limiter for this webhooks API to prevent similar spikes in usage impacting others and will further refine the rate limits for other webhook API routes to help prevent similar occurrences in the future.
Resolved
Slack outage has been resolved. We've returned to fully functionality
Resolved
The delays in SIM card management actions have been resolved. All operations are processing normally.
Resolved
The delays in SIM card management actions have been resolved. All operations are processing normally.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved. Due to a BGP issue, we saw some North American traffic routed to edges in Singapore (sin). Users in North America would have seen additional request latency during this period.
Resolved
Convex had downtime for some customers caused by an anomalous load spike that pushed an internal service into a load-shedding mode, which then triggered an unexpected panic in a caching library we were using. Specifically the load triggered two queue management algorithms: CoDel which proactively drops requests to keep queues small, and adaptive-LIFO which dequeues in reverse order to avoid wasting time on old requests. These are both rather subtle algorithms that large services use to avoid congestion collapse under high load or attack. The panic in the caching library was just a bug that depended on both these algorithms simultaneously. We've made some changes as a result of this incident but the key lesson is that services should try to avoid switching logical behavior during high load. When systems are stressed switching to infrequently-used codepaths can often make matters worse. We're now going to be proactively triggering CoDel and adaptive-LIFO at steady state to ensure that we're exercising this worst-case flow at all times. We apologize to our customers for impacting your products and services. We’re focusing intensely over the next few weeks on hardening our systems to prevent issues like this from happening again.
Resolved
Severity Level: [High] Our Engineering team was able to identify and remediate the root cause of the issue. Users that were experiencing instance launch failures should no longer be impacted. In the event you’re unsure as to whether your service is still impacted by this incident, please open a support ticket. We’ll get back to you as soon as possible. • https://support.lambdalabs.com/hc/en-us/requests/new To be automatically notified when the status of this incident changes, please click on the “Subscribe to updates” button. Thank you for your patience and understanding during this time.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
Search latency should be in line with normal performance for all customers. We are continuing to investigate and prevent any further issues.
Resolved
This issue should now be resolved and all services are restored to normal functionality. Please don’t hesitate to reach out to team@intercom.io: mailto:team@intercom.io if you have any further questions or if you’re still seeing any unexpected behaviour
Resolved
This issue should now be resolved and all services are restored to normal functionality. Please don’t hesitate to reach out to team@intercom.io: mailto:team@intercom.io if you have any further questions or if you’re still seeing any unexpected behaviour
Resolved
This issue should now be resolved and all services are restored to normal functionality. Please don’t hesitate to reach out to team@intercom.io: mailto:team@intercom.io if you have any further questions or if you’re still seeing any unexpected behaviour
Resolved
Resolved: Stability Issues - Jupyter Notebook Labs Status Update Message Resolved - The stability issues affecting Jupyter Notebook Labs have been fully resolved. After a period of monitoring, we have confirmed that the system is stable and operating at normal parameters. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused.
Resolved
The incident has been resolved.
Resolved
O problema ao acessar as plataformas RD Station Conversas e CRM foi resolvida com sucesso. Caso você note que sua conta ainda contém alguma inconsistência, por favor, entre em contato com nosso Time de Suporte através da nossa Central de Ajuda "através da nossa Central de Ajuda": http://ajuda.rdstation.com/..
Resolved
The affected areas of HubSpot are now fully accessible. We've identified and addressed the root cause of the issue. The incident has been fully resolved and The affected areas of HubSpot should be working properly. No data was lost.
Resolved
Our monitoring confirmed that the issue has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
Normal service has been restored.
Resolved
Confluent Cloud Metrics API are now fully functional. The incident has been resolved and systems are functioning as normal.
Resolved
All impacted services have now fully recovered.
Resolved
All impacted services have now fully recovered.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
All impacted services have now fully recovered.
Resolved
The issue has been resolved.
Resolved
On March 2nd, 2026, between 7:10 UTC and 22:04 UTC the pull requests service was degraded. Users navigating between tabs on the pull requests dashboard were met with 404 errors or blank pages.<br /><br />This was due to a configuration change deployed on February 27th at 11:03 PM UTC. We mitigated the incident by reverting the change.<br /><br />We’re working to improve monitoring for the page to automatically detect and alert us to routing failures.
Resolved