DevinDevin Cloud is unavailable
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
Outages and recoveries from the services you depend on.
40 incidents
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
On August 10, 2026, between 17:16 and 18:21 UTC, users were unable to create new fine-grained personal access tokens (FG PAT) through the GitHub website. When a user submitted the FG PAT creation form, they were returned to the FG PAT list without an error message and no FG PAT was created. Creating classic personal access tokens, as well as editing or deleting existing FG PAT were not affected.<br /><br />The cause was a change to how the website loads certain front-end JavaScript that was enabled for all users at 17:15 UTC; the change interacted with an issue in the token creation form's confirmation step that prevented it from running, so the final submission that actually creates the token never completed. Because the page still loaded and the server returned a normal response, the failure produced no error message. GitHub mitigated the incident by disabling the change at 18:21 UTC, at which point token creation recovered immediately, and the incident was resolved at 18:46 UTC.<br /><br />To reduce the chance of recurrence, GitHub is adding monitoring and alerting for anomalies in the FG PAT creation success rate and is removing the issue in the FG PAT creation form that prevented the confirmation step from running. GitHub is also adding automated detection of the issue so other areas of the GitHub front end do not repeat the problem.
Resolved
All services are now operational.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This issue is resolved
Resolved
Between Aug 13, 09:50 UTC and 14:30 UTC, customers in the FRA1 region experienced an issue affecting Block Storage Volumes attachment and detachment operations on Droplets and Managed Kubernetes clusters. During this window, customers may have encountered delays or been unable to attach and detach Block Storage Volumes from their resources. Block Storage Volumes attachment and detachment operations now appear to be functioning normally, and customers should no longer experience issues with these operations. For Managed Kubernetes clusters specifically, some residual cleanup of affected volume attachments may still be needed, and our team is actively working through this. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused. If you continue to experience issues with Block Storage Volumes operations, please don't hesitate to open a support ticket for further investigation. Our team will be happy to assist you.
Resolved
This issue has been resolved.
Resolved
We are pleased to inform you that the incident affecting our Object Storage offering has been resolved. <b>Start time :</b> 13/08/2026 09:15 UTC <b>End time :</b> 13/08/2026 10:16 UTC <b>Root Cause :</b> A service disruption occurred due to an unexpected infrastructure failure. We apologize for any inconvenience caused and appreciate your understanding.
Resolved
We can confirm that the issue was mitigated at 11:50 UTC on August 12, 2026, and the service has resumed normal operation. Customers and partners can view additional details about the incident by logging in to: https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/feed/0D5a700001NOXC4CAP or reaching out to Akamai Support. We apologize for the impact and thank you for your patience and continued support. We are committed to making continuous improvements to make our systems better and prevent a recurrence of this issue.
Resolved
We experienced a brief period of elevated error rates and latency on the Cloud Ops API, lasting approximately 5 minutes (from 11.41 UTC to 11.46 UTC). The incident has been resolved, and the Cloud Ops API is operating normally. We are investigating the cause. We apologize for the disruption.
Resolved
We have continued to see normal activity in this region, with latencies holding at pre-incident levels. This incident is now resolved.
Resolved
The issue has been addressed.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This issue has been resolved.
Resolved
We've resolved the issue affecting Serverless project creation and modifications. All systems are now operating normally.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
The Navy Federal Credit Union issue has been resolved
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
The issue is resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has now been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
Some customers intermittently experienced issues creating or duplicating sites, creating or viewing page branches, previewing site backups, or loading the Webflow Canvas between 13:40 and 20:45 UTC today. We’re no longer seeing customer impact related to this issue, and this incident is now resolved. We appreciate your patience while we worked to resolve this issue.
Resolved
# **Summary** On July 31, 2026, artifact uploads performed through pipeline in the EU1 cluster began failing with an authentication error. Uploads initiated manually \(outside of a pipeline\) were not affected, and the ability to retrieve existing artifacts \(downloads\) was also unaffected — this was isolated to the specific pipeline upload path in one cluster. # **Impact** * Artifact uploads performed through pipeline in the EU1 cluster failed with an authentication error for approximately 4 hours and 34 minutes. * Retrieving existing artifacts \(downloads\) was not affected. * Manually uploading artifacts outside of a pipeline was not affected. * Other clusters/regions were not affected by this issue. # **Root Cause** The component responsible for handling pipeline-based artifact uploads is distributed as a container image. In the EU1 cluster, this image is retrieved from an internal registry that mirrors a public image source; in other clusters, the same image is retrieved directly from the public source. A publishing error in our release process caused a new build of this component to be published using a version label that was already in use, rather than being assigned a new, unique version. As a result, two different images ended up associated with the same version label in the public source. Our internal registry mirrors images from the public source via an automated replication process. Because of how that replication was triggered, it copied the original \(earlier\) image associated with that version label rather than the corrected one. This meant the EU1 cluster — which pulls from the internal mirror — ended up running a different, defective image than other clusters, which pull directly from the public source and therefore received the corrected image. The defective image contained an authentication issue that caused pipeline uploads to fail. # **Mitigation** * Reverted the affected account to the last known-good version of the upload component, immediately restoring pipeline uploads. * Published a corrected, permanent version of the component to resolve the issue across all clusters. # **Next steps** * Fix the upload step to remove the underlying container-related defect that made this failure mode possible. * Update our release pipeline for this component so that publishing an image can never overwrite an existing version — every publish must create a new, distinct version going forward.
Resolved
Fix is deployed.
Resolved
3rd party provider downloads are confirmed to be functioning. Please retry any failed Terraform runs, and contact support if you have any further problems.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
We recently addressed issues affecting file uploads and edits that create new file versions. We want to explain what happened and what we have done to prevent it from happening again. Between Jul 26, 2026 4:38 PM PDT and Jul 28, 2026 10:34 AM PDT, some users may have experienced delays or failures when uploading files or saving edits that create new file versions. The impact was limited to cases with a high number of concurrent uploads or edits on the same file. During this period, concurrent upload and edit traffic contended on shared database locks while creating new file versions. Under load, an overly conservative insert locking strategy acquired locks, creating a bottleneck in the database. The contention was amplified by background processes that post-process the uploaded file and attach additional information to every new version, competing for the same locks. # Analysis This incident highlighted several opportunities for improvement: * Lock-wait failures do not appear in our usual change-stream / mutation telemetry, which delayed our investigation. * Background processes can contend with upload and edit paths that create new versions. Our development environments did not fully test this particular interaction under load. Remediation combined an immediate reduction in non-essential background scan load with a code change that relaxed the overly conservative locking behavior, while preserving the intended isolation guarantees. # Corrective Actions Box has initiated the following corrective actions: * Deploy and validate the insert-behavior fix across all live clusters \(completed and confirmed\). * Improve observability for lock-wait and timeout-driven load so contention sources are visible. We are continuously working to improve Box and want to make sure we are delivering the best product and user experience we can. We hope we have provided some clarity here and we would be happy to answer any questions you may still have regarding this matter. Sincerely, The Box Team
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
Backlogs have been processed
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
On August 12, 2026 some Confluence users utilizing anonymous access via public links, may have experienced a 'Something went wrong' error message. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.
Resolved
Root issue has been resolved, service is healthy.
Resolved