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40 incidents

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Aug 19, 2026

  1. Box[Minor] Issues with All Files Page

    After further monitoring, this incident is now considered resolved. All Files Page Service has been restored to full functionality. If you continue to experience any issues, please contact Box Support at https://support.box.com.

    Resolved

  2. VercelElevated errors for Workflow streams

    From 10:57pm to 11:43pm UTC, a percentage of Workflows streams calls failed. Workflow steps that had a failing stream call would retry, and if the step hit the max retries, the workflow failed. Workflow streams have recovered and are working correctly now.

    Resolved

  3. Box[Medium] Issues with Box Shuttle Standalone

    We recently addressed issues affecting Shuttle standalone jobs. We would like to take the opportunity to further explain these issues and the steps we have taken to keep them from happening in the future. Between 3:41 AM and 3:57 AM PDT on July 31, 2026, some customers using Shuttle Standalone could sign in to their Shuttle Standalone accounts and view their dashboards, but could not view job details, change job settings, or create new standalone jobs. The Shuttle native experience was not affected. After we restored service, we confirmed that customers could access existing jobs and create new ones. # Analysis A misconfiguration in Shuttle resulted in depleted resources that accessed job history. This caused Shuttle pages that load job history to time out. We restored access by restarting the affected services at 3:57 AM PDT. Job management returned to normal, with no recurrence. This briefly blocked the standalone experience for affected customers, even though sign-in and the Shuttle native experience continued to work. # Corrective Actions Box has initiated the following corrective actions: * Updating the capacity allocation to avoid the recurrence of this issue * Adding monitoring to better preempt the issue from occurring We are continuously working to improve Box and want to make sure we are delivering the best product and user experience we can. We hope we have provided some clarity here and we would be happy to answer any questions you may still have regarding this matter. Sincerely, The Box Team

    Resolved

  4. Fly.io6PN Networking issue in YYZ

    6PN networking issues between some machines in YYZ during a rollout which was rolled back once we noticed errors. During this time some machines were unable to talk to internal resources like other DBs, other apps or MPG clusters.

    Resolved

Aug 18, 2026

  1. ZapierZapier Functions temporarily unavailable

    The issue affecting Zapier Functions has been resolved. Functions are now operating normally. During this incident, users were unable to create, edit, or run Functions. No data loss occurred. Zaps and other Zapier services were not affected during this time. If you are still experiencing issues, contact Support: https://zapier.com/app/get-help Thank you for your patience.

    Resolved

  2. GrafanaCloud Logs read path outage on eu-west-2

    We observed an issue which impacted the following service: reads of Cloud Logs in the eu-west-2 region. Affected services would include Explore, dashboards, alert evaluation when querying Logs. The time of impact lasted from approximately 22h15 and 22h23 UTC, on loki-prod-012. This incident has since been resolved.

    Resolved

  3. SentryAlert backlogs in US

    The problem has been resolved, all backlogs have cleared and everything is operational again.

    Resolved

  4. NetlifyElevated HTTP 500 errors serving sites and the Netlify UI

    On August 18 between 20:02 and 20:08 UTC, some visitors to Netlify-hosted sites and people using the Netlify dashboard received error pages instead of the content they requested. Normal service was restored at 20:08 UTC. We apologize for the disruption

    Resolved

  5. AkamaiConnection drops and increased latency in Miami

    We can confirm that the issue was confirmed mitigated at 20:42 UTC on August 18, 2026 and the service has resumed normal operation. Customers and partners can view additional details about the incident by logging in to: https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/feed/0D5a700001Nh4U3CAJ or reaching out to Akamai Support. We apologize for the impact and thank you for your patience and continued support. We are committed to making continuous improvements to make our systems better and prevent a recurrence of this issue.

    Resolved

  6. MintlifyAuthenticated docs sites are erroring

    Resolved: Authenticated documentation sites experienced elevated 500 errors from 2:08–2:21 PM PT due to an internal authentication configuration mismatch. Service has been fully restored, and we are monitoring recovery. No customer action is required.

    Resolved

  7. LinodeService Issue - Linode Kubernetes Engine Enterprise (LKE-E)- IAD2 (Washington)

    Between 17:25 UTC and 22:50 UTC on August 13, 2026, Linode Kubernetes Engine Enterprise \(LKE-E\) customers attempting to deploy G7 dedicated Linode instances in our Washington \(IAD2\) data center, received 403 provisioning error messages. Active workloads and running instances were not affected by this issue. Our investigation revealed that while total physical hardware capacity in IAD2 was sufficient, the provisioning request triggered an entitlement check failure due to an initial soft host-allocation threshold. Akamai resolved the issue by increasing the Linode-per-host limit from 5 to 20 in IAD2. Full deployment capabilities were restored and stabilized at 22:50 UTC. To prevent recurrence moving forward, we will implement dedicated alerting for entitlement and capacity issues, directly linked to response runbooks for rapid remediation. Additionally, we are building a centralized capacity overview dashboard to proactively track regional headroom. This summary provides an overview of our current understanding of the incident given the information available. Our investigation is ongoing and any information herein is subject to change.

    Resolved

  8. MongoDB CloudAtlas UI and API Periodic Unavailability

    This incident has been resolved. Following the incident, we identified an issue that caused some internal Atlas jobs not to start as scheduled, resulting in delays to certain changes. The issue was related to this incident "Atlas UI and API Periodic Unavailability" which has been remediated. Customer clusters and their data were not affected; the impact was limited to the timing of control-plane operations. This jobs issue has been resolved as well.

    Resolved

  9. GitHubIncident with GitHub.com

    On August 17, 2026, from 13:28–21:15 UTC (7h 47m), GitHub.com experienced elevated errors and latency across Issues, Pull Requests, APIs, Actions, and Copilot. At peak, web/API error rates were approximately 20%, while archive and raw-content downloads reached approximately 50%. SAML/OIDC authentication, SCIM, and Team Sync were also affected, as well as Actions workflows in GHEC with Data Residency that depend on public workflow step definitions hosted on GitHub.com. Most services recovered by 16:36 UTC as our Central US datacenter recovered; Actions was degraded until approximately 18:03 UTC; and Copilot Token Service fully recovered by 21:02. <br /><br />Some of the failing traffic was moved from Central US to Northern Virginia where it was served successfully until the network failure in Central US was debugged and resolved. Delayed replies to a single internal endpoint triggered a latent retry bug in VS Code that amplified traffic by approximately 10x and caused delayed recovery for the Copilot Token Service. <br /><br />The immediate cause of the failure was network saturation on load balancers in Central US due to a new peak in traffic. Originally this was caused by an Istio sidecar pod reaching its concurrency limits and failing to auto scale correctly because of a misconfigured policy that watched host service but not sidecar limits. One failure cascaded to more and eventually four HAProxy nodes exhausted their flow limits, degrading the gateway auth path and causing widespread authentication latency and failures. The problem was worsened by optimistic retry logic which overloaded internal load balancers. Pausing HAProxy on those nodes simultaneously produced immediate broad recovery. <br /><br />The retry storm in Northern VA was fixed by 1) temporarily reducing gateway retry logic with a PR and 2) blocking inbound Copilot Token Service token requests at the load balancers with a 403, and then gradually ramping back up traffic per-site to allow callers to succeed. <br /><br />Residual Copilot authentication failures continued because client retry behavior amplified load: a failed token operation could generate many extra requests and enter a retry loop. Copilot Token Service traffic increased from a normal 7–9K RPS to 70–100K RPS. Reducing gateway authentication retries and blocking retry-triggering responses stabilized Copilot Token Service and completed recovery. <br /><br />Complicating factors that impeded recovery included a number of scraping attacks on codeload endpoints. <br /><br />To prevent recurrence, our follow-up actions include: <br /><br />- Correcting autoscaling policies to account for service-mesh sidecar concurrency and capacity. <br /><br />- Auditing Istio request, concurrency, and scaling limits across affected services. <br /><br />- Reviewing retry limits and backoff behavior across gateways and clients. <br /><br />- Addressing the VS Code retry behavior that amplified Copilot token traffic. <br /><br />- Improving load-balancer capacity monitoring and regional failover safeguards.

    Resolved

  10. LinodeConnectivity Issue - IT-MIL (Milan) data center

    On August 14, 2026, starting around 17:30 UTC, during an event in our IT-MIL \(Milan\) data center, multiple alerts were triggered indicating that multiple hosts in this data center became unreachable. ‌ Akamai immediately began investigating the issue and working to restore the impacted hosts. During the impact window, customers would have experienced intermittent connection timeouts and errors across all services deployed in this data center. ‌ We restored the impacted hosts and fixed the connectivity issues at 21:20 UTC on August 14, 2026. We are still investigating the cause of the failure condition. ‌ We are committed to preventing future incidents and will conduct a thorough investigation into why the hosts became unreachable, implementing measures to enhance stability and reliability. ‌ This summary provides an overview of our current understanding of the incident given the information available. Our investigation is ongoing, and any information herein is subject to change.

    Resolved

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