Live outage feed

Outages and recoveries from the services you depend on.

Earlier incidents

40 incidents

Back to latest

Aug 24, 2026

  1. BufferIssue Publishing Posts to TikTok

    We have seen the success rate of TikTok posts hold steady. It appears the underlying cause of the issue has been resolved. Don't hesitate to let us know if you continue to experience any issues. We'd be happy to take a look.

    Resolved

  2. AkamaiEdge Delivery Issues in India

    We can confirm that the issue was mitigated at 14:25 UTC on August 22, 2026, and the service has resumed normal operation. Customers and partners can view additional details about the incident by logging in to: https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/feed/0D5a700001Psh2gCAB or reaching out to Akamai Support. We apologize for the impact and thank you for your patience and continued support. We are committed to making continuous improvements to make our systems better and prevent a recurrence of this issue.

    Resolved

  3. GitHubDisruption with GHEC Team Sync

    On August 13, 2026, from 15:31:21 UTC to 18:27:55 UTC, GitHub Enterprise Cloud team synchronization was degraded for enterprises using personal accounts. Organization teams experienced delays of up to 3 to 13 hours (median 8 hours) when syncing with IdP groups, resulting in delayed access grants or removals for enterprise users across 2.8% of teams. <br /><br />A temporary change introduced to address a previous issue due to increased usage of this feature remained active after it was intended to be removed, causing synchronization delays during periods of high volume. We removed the temporary change and provisioned additional resources to handle the increased volume.

    Resolved

  4. Box[Medium] Issues with Uploads and Downloads

    On August 4, 2026 between 12:10 PM PDT and 1:20 PM PDT, some customers experienced failures and delays when uploading files to Box. The problem was caused by a routing issue on our frontend load balancers. We restored service by rerouting upload traffic and provisioning additional capacity. # Analysis A temporary network connectivity disruption impacted a small part of our load balancing fleet, causing a spike of TCP retransmit errors. Our engineering team mitigated the impact by redirecting traffic away from the affected region, which restored normal upload operations and resolved the errors. This incident highlighted opportunities to improve observable signals and alerting for TCP retransmit errors. # Corrective Actions Box has initiated the following corrective actions: * Improve monitoring and alerting for the isolated TCP retransmit issues. * Review and update operational runbooks for isolating problematic instances and for capacity management to shorten time to mitigation. ‌ We are continuously working to improve Box and want to make sure we are delivering the best product and user experience we can. We hope we have provided some clarity here and we would be happy to answer any questions you may still have regarding this matter. Sincerely, The Box Team

    Resolved

  5. Confluent CloudConfluent Cloud logging degradation - Connect and Flink

    Between 21:15 – 22:30 UTC and 00:05 – 01:15 UTC on Aug 23–24, 2026, Confluent Cloud logging service was degraded. Customers may notice missing Connect and Flink logs in the Confluent Cloud UI, the Confluent CLI, and configured logging integration destinations during these windows. Other log types and the Connect / Flink workloads themselves were unaffected. The issue has been mitigated.

    Resolved

  6. Lever500 Errors when attempting to access Lever

    Status: Resolved Our monitoring has confirmed that there are no further issues related to this incident. Service has remained stable, and the incident is now considered resolved. A Root Cause Analysis (RCA) will be provided within 7-10 business days.

    Resolved

  7. LaunchDarklyEmail delivery failure affecting sign-up verification and notification emails

    Email delivery has been restored as of 2:32 PM UTC. Sign-up verification, password reset, teammate invitation, and notification emails are sending normally again. We are re-sending sign-up verification and password reset emails that failed to deliver during the incident window (August 22, 11:48 PM CDT through today). If you attempted to sign up or reset a password during that period and haven't received an email within the next few hours, please retry the action or contact support. We are continuing to monitor email delivery closely and will post a final update once we've confirmed sustained recovery.

    Resolved

  8. PaddleRetain

    The incident affecting Retain has been fully resolved. All services are now operating normally. We apologize for any disruption this may have caused. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact our Customer Support team at sellers@paddle.com.

    Resolved

  9. GitHubDegraded Git Operations over SSH

    On August 21, 2026, between 14:00 and 14:07 UTC, dotcom Git operations over SSH were degraded. Successful Git operations over SSH fell by more than 95% for during the peak impact window, making clone, fetch, or push over SSH effectively unavailable to most users for approximately four minutes. Git operations over HTTPS were not affected. The incident was caused by a software defect in our load-balancing infrastructure that was triggered by a configuration change. The defect only occurred when connections passed through multiple layers of load balancers running the new configuration, which meant it was not detected during canary testing. We mitigated the incident by rolling back the configuration change. We are adding regression coverage for multi-layer load-balancer configurations and improving monitoring and alerting for Git operations over SSH to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of similar issues in the future.

    Resolved

  10. GitHubIntermittent failures in runner group and runner-related permissions pages

    On August 18, 2026, between 05:02 UTC and 11:30 UTC, customers were unable to view or manage Actions Runners and Runner Groups through the GitHub UI and API. <br /><br />The issue was caused by failures in backend requests reading runner and runner group data. The failures were caused by an expired authentication certificate unique to this service. The certificate had been rotated in KeyVault, but a step to enable use at runtime had been paused to prevent recurrence of previous incidents triggered by this operation. <br /><br />The impact was mitigated by completing the enablement of the new certificate in the backend system. We have added additional monitoring to this and other certificates. This service is also in the process of being replaced as part of our availability and scale work, bringing this authentication path and secret management in line with patterns across all GitHub services.

    Resolved

  11. GitHubIncident with Actions

    On August 18, 2026, between 05:02 UTC and 11:30 UTC, customers were unable to run jobs on Actions Larger Runners and were unable to view or manage Actions Runners and Runner Groups through the GitHub UI and API. <br /><br />These issues were caused by failures in backend requests resolving essential metadata for starting Larger Runner workflow runs and for reading runner and runner group data. The failures were caused by an expired authentication certificate unique to this service. The certificate had been rotated in KeyVault, but a step to enable use at runtime had been paused to prevent recurrence of previous incidents that had been triggered by this operation. <br /><br />We mitigated the issues by completing the enablement of the new certificate in the backend system. We have added additional monitoring to this and other certificates. The relevant service is also in the process of being replaced as part of our availability and scale work, bringing this authentication path and secret management in line with patterns across all GitHub services.

    Resolved

  12. SupabaseError spikes in one of the eu-east-1 Supavisor clusters

    Between 04:54 and 04:58 UTC we observed error spikes in one of the eu-east-1 Supavisor clusters. Users would have experienced errors in connecting to postgres via Supavisor. The issue has since recovered. Errors reported: ClientHandler: (ECHECKOUTTIMEOUT) unable to check out connection from the pool after 15000ms in Transaction mode.

    Resolved

  13. XeroAU: Batch Payments - some customers may be unable to process batch payments in Xero.

    Our team has resolved the issue impacting Australian customers trying to process batch payments in Xero. We apologise for any inconvenience this has caused. A product release caused batch payments to become unavailable and a rollback has returned sevice. We learn from every incident and put measures in place to prevent issues from happening again.

    Resolved

  14. UdemyInvestigating Web Login Application Errors

    Our engineering team has resolved the issue affecting logged-in learners on Udemy.com. Users were experiencing application errors on the homepage and My Learning page when accessing the site via desktop web browsers. A fix has been fully deployed and the issue is no longer occurring. No action is required on your end. We apologize for the disruption and thank you for your patience.

    Resolved

Aug 23, 2026

  1. LiveKitEgress recordings terminated early in US East

    From 09:18 UTC on 21 August to 21:00 UTC on 23 August, 0.008% of egress recordings processed in our US East region were terminated before completion. Affected recordings were marked EGRESS_FAILED ("egress timed out"). For file outputs, media was not written to the configured destination; for HLS and streaming destinations, media was delivered up to the point of failure. The cause was node scale-down evicting egress workers with active recordings. A fix was deployed at 21:00 UTC on 23 August.

    Resolved

  2. HarnessFME API write operations started returning 499 errors

    ### Summary On August 20, 2026, between 10:24 and 14:55 UTC, a subset of FME writes failed. Writes made from the FME UI and writes made with Harness access tokens \(PATs and SATs\) were not affected. Runtime flag evaluation continued to work normally. The issue was mitigated by reverting a recent authentication change in a shared governance service, and affected writes returned to normal by 14:55 UTC. Status: [https://status.harness.io/incidents/rhthgm7d5dkz](https://status.harness.io/incidents/rhthgm7d5dkz) ### Root Cause A change in how a shared governance service authenticated inbound calls resulted in some FME writes being rejected. Those writes used service-to-service credentials that the governance service could no longer verify after the change. FME surfaces a governance failure to the client as HTTP 499, the same status used when a governance policy intentionally denies a change. Because 499 is a valid, expected response in that deny path, the failures did not look like an outage on our alerts, and the incident was identified from customer reports rather than internal detection. ### Impact * A subset of FME writes failed during the window, primarily those made using legacy Split API keys or change request scheduling. * Writes made from the FME UI were not impacted. * Writes using Harness access tokens \(PATs and SATs\) were not impacted. * Runtime flag evaluation continued normally. * No data loss occurred. Failed writes did not apply. ‌ ### Remediation Reverted the governance-service authentication change. Affected writes returned to normal immediately. ### Action Items To prevent such issues from happening again, * Harness will return a distinct error \(not 499\) when a write fails because governance could not be evaluated, so it is not confused with an intentional policy denial. * Add alerting on the governance evaluation call itself, rather than relying on the client-facing status code. * Expand authentication support for policy evaluations. * Expand automated coverage for additional write scenarios.

    Resolved

Older incidents