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40 incidents

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Apr 17, 2026

  1. JiraMultiple products impacted by search failures

    ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

    Resolved

  2. ConfluenceMultiple products impacted by search failures

    ### Summary On April 8, 2026, between 04:46 UTC and 12:09 UTC, search functionality was unavailable or degraded across several Atlassian Cloud products, including Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. A configuration change increased the resources reserved for a core system component that runs on nodes in our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high‑density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity interrupting search and related experiences for affected customers. The root cause was identified and a rollback was merged at 05:42 UTC with some systems seeing recovery by 07:33 UTC**.** Core search functionality was restored approximately by 08:55 UTC, and full downstream recovery completed by 12:09 UTC. ### **IMPACT** During the impact period, some customers experienced outages or degradation in search across Jira, Confluence, Jira Service Management, Rovo, Rovo Dev, Loom, Guard Standard, Customer Service Management and Atlassian Administration. Other experiences that rely on search such as quick find, navigation, AI assistants, dashboards, were also intermittently affected during this period. Impacted customers may have been unable to find pages or recordings and experienced degraded performance in finding issues; received empty or delayed search results; or experienced AI assistants and dashboards that could not retrieve relevant context. **Jira, Jira Service Management and Customer Service Management:** Search and experiences that depend on search like finding issues and agent responses in CSM remained available but with degraded performance in fallback mode. By 12:09 UTC, search indexes and search performance was fully restored from fallback to full capacity across all regions. **Guard Standard and Atlassian Administration:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. As a result, Domain Claims, usage tracking, and managed accounts were degraded for portions of the window. These services were restored to operational status by 07:33 UTC. Guard Premium was not impacted by this issue. **Confluence:** Search functionality was unavailable for parts of the incident window. Recovery began at 07:30 UTC as backend search clusters were restored. Full recovery, including search index replay, completed at 11:37 UTC. **Loom:** Search functionality and some experiences that rely on Confluence Search, such as sharing to spaces\) was unavailable for portions of the window and fully restored at 11:37 UTC. **Rovo and Rovo Dev:** Rovo agents remained responsive but experienced degraded functionality due to loss of search capabilities in underlying services. They were unable to reliably return context about work items or pages. Functionality was fully restored at 11:37 UTC. ### **ROOT CAUSE** Atlassian products rely on OpenSearch clusters to power their search capabilities including issue search, content search, and AI-powered search features. An infrastructure configuration change increased resource reservations \(CPU & Memory\) for a system component that runs across our compute platform. On a subset of clusters configured for high-density workloads, the increased reservations exceeded available node capacity. This caused search workloads to be evicted and, in some clusters, could not reschedule onto any available nodes impacting search functionality across affected products. The change was deployed across multiple production clusters in a short time frame, limiting the opportunity to detect the capacity conflict in a smaller subset of clusters before it reached the wider fleet. Automated scaling systems attempted to recover by provisioning additional capacity but in the worst‑affected clusters this led to runaway node scaling and exhaustion of available network resources, prolonging recovery time. ### **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We understand that service disruptions impact your productivity. In addition to our existing testing and preventative processes, Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents in the future and to speed up recovery when issues occur: * **Enforce smaller deployment cohorts and larger soak for critical platform changes for these cluster types** Implement smaller deployment cohorts, mandatory soak periods between environments, and automated health gates so that changes are validated on a limited set of clusters before being promoted more broadly. * **Strengthen automated pre‑deploy validation for resource changes** Add validation checks to ensure resource changes for system components are compatible with node capacity and reserved headroom, preventing system workloads from crowding out customer workloads. * **Improve post‑deploy verification and alerting** Enhance monitoring and post‑deployment verification to detect patterns such as spikes in pending pods, runaway node scaling, and low pod‑IP headroom closely correlated with new configuration being rolled out. * **Align autoscaling behavior with capacity and safety limits** Align autoscaling capacity calculations with node reservations and introduce safeguards and circuit breakers to prevent runaway scaling and to enforce safe limits on node and pod IP counts. * **Enhance recovery automation** Improve automation and runbooks so we can safely disable autoscaling, remove empty nodes in bulk, and restore normal operations faster across multiple clusters in parallel. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability and to reduce the risk and impact of similar issues in future. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

    Resolved

  3. LovableAll messages showing 0 credits deducted

    All new messages should now show the correct amount of credits deducted. We are working on updating and backfilling the earlier affected messages that are still showing as 0 credits deducted. Thank you for your patience!

    Resolved

  4. HootsuiteBluesky API issues

    Bluesky services have been fully restored and are now accessible via the Hootsuite dashboard. We have confirmed that publishing and authentication are stable. If you have any failed posts, please reschedule them or manually retry the publication. If your profile appears disconnected, you may now successfully reconnect your social network. Thank you for your patience!

    Resolved

  5. BufferBluesky Service Disruption

    The issue with Bluesky is now fully resolved, and all systems are now operational. We appreciate your understanding and apologise for any disruption this may have caused.

    Resolved

  6. GitHubDisruption with some GitHub services

    On April 13, 2026, between 14:41 UTC and 17:29 UTC, the Copilot service experienced degraded performance. All Copilot users were impacted by increased latency, and approximately 20% experienced request failures when interacting with Copilot Cloud Agent (CCA). On average, request latency increased to approximately 950ms. The GitHub User Dashboard also displayed intermittent errors loading Copilot quota information. CCA and the User Dashboard were impacted for approximately 2 hours and 56 minutes. <br /><br />This was due to an infrastructure change that reduced the available compute capacity for a backend service responsible for Copilot rate limiting and quota management. The reduced capacity caused resource exhaustion under normal traffic load, leading to cascading failures in downstream request processing. <br /><br />We mitigated the incident by increasing compute resources allocated to the affected service and scaling out the number of service instances to distribute load more effectively. <br /><br />We are working to improve proactive capacity monitoring to detect resource degradation before it impacts users, reviewing retry and timeout configurations across dependent services to reduce amplification during degraded states, and evaluating connection management strategies to improve resilience under constrained resources.

    Resolved

Apr 16, 2026

  1. GitHubIncident with Pages

    On Sunday April 13th, 2026, between 18:53 UTC and 20:30 UTC, the GitHub Pages service experienced elevated error rates. On average, the error rate was 10.58% and peaked at 12.77% of requests to the service, resulting in approximately 17.5 million failed requests returning HTTP 500 errors. This was due to an automated DNS management tool (octodns) erroneously deleting a DNS record for a Pages backend storage host after its upstream data source intermittently failed to return the record, causing the tool to treat it as stale and remove it.<br /><br />We mitigated the incident by re-creating the deleted DNS record. To prevent future incidents, we are implementing availability-zone-tolerant routing in the Pages frontend so that an unresolvable backend host triggers failover to healthy hosts rather than returning errors, adding safeguards to prevent automated deletion of DNS records owned by other systems, and improving logging and alerting for DNS resolution failures in the Pages serving path.

    Resolved

  2. BubbleData Loading Delays

    The team has deployed changes to production and performance has been restored. The team will continue to monitor into the night, but we are currently calling the issue resolved.

    Resolved

  3. Customer.ioCustomer.io UI currently experiencing issues

    Customers who are currently working in our UI are likely to have seen elevated errors or loading. Our engineers are aware, investigated, and have resolved this issue. Thank you for your patience and understanding!

    Resolved

  4. MintlifyDocumentation Sites Experiencing Outages

    The intermittent outages and slow load times on our documentation sites have been resolved. The root cause was an upstream server issue. All services should be operating normally.

    Resolved

  5. BitbucketBitbucket Pipelines degraded performance

    On April 16 at 8:00PM UTC Bitbucket Pipelines users may have experienced performance degradation running new pipelines. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

    Resolved

  6. PantheonSecurity Advisory: Unauthorized Access via Credential Stuffing

    Final Update: We have concluded our investigation into the reports of unauthorized account access. Our team has worked directly with the small number of affected customers to secure their accounts and remediate any unauthorized changes. Monitoring & Conclusion: We have seen no further evidence of unauthorized activity related to this incident. Our systems remain secure, and we continue to monitor for suspicious login patterns. Ongoing Security Best Practices: While this incident is resolved, credential stuffing remains a common web-wide threat. To keep your account secure, we strongly recommend: • Enabling MFA on all Pantheon user accounts. • Using unique passwords managed via a password manager. • Rotating secrets/keys if you suspect your local environment has been compromised. Thank you for your patience as we worked to keep the Pantheon community secure.

    Resolved

  7. HubSpotHubSpot may be unavailable for some users

    Between 12:19 PM (UTC -07:00) and 12:40 AM (UTC -07:00), many customers in North America experienced issues with marketing tools, operations tools, sales tools, service tools. This was caused by a server impairment. As of 12:40 AM (UTC -07:00), our marketing tools, operations tools, sales tools, service tools are working properly and the incident has been fully resolved. HubSpot conducts a thorough review after each incident to understand the cause and prevent it from happening again. Learn more about HubSpot's commitment to reliability at www.HubSpot.com/reliability. The information on this page reflects our understanding of the incident and impact at the time of the update.

    Resolved

  8. RD StationErro no login com email/senha no RD Station Conversas

    O erro no login do RD Station Conversas foi resolvida com sucesso. Caso você note que sua conta ainda contém alguma inconsistência, por favor, entre em contato com nosso Time de Suporte através da nossa Central de Ajuda "através da nossa Central de Ajuda": http://ajuda.rdstation.com/..

    Resolved

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