FigmaService Disruption
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
Outages and recoveries from the services you depend on.
40 incidents
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This issue has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident is resolved. DNS creation for new projects has been fixed since 20:35 UTC. Backfill of missing DNS records has been completed at 22:20 UTC. Please contact Support if your project seems impacted by missing DNS records.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
Resolved
On July 23, 2026, between 07:08 and 09:39 UTC, several services experienced delays: 8% of actions workflow runs experienced an average run start delay of 10 minutes, 5% of webhook deliveries exceeded SLO, and code scanning, repos, notifications, issues and pull requests experienced increased latency over the life of the incident. <br /><br />The root cause of the incident was a node of our background job processing system which did not recover after entering scheduled host maintenance. The incident was mitigated by identifying the problematic shard and restoring its correct state, after which queue backlogs drained and services recovered. <br /><br />To speed mitigation, we have added monitors for nodes in this unhealthy state after maintenance operations. To prevent future recurrence, we are adapting our lifecycle automation to verify host rejoin after a scheduled reboot.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
We have continued to observe normal error rates. We will now be marking this incident as resolved. Details surrounding the incident can be seen here: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-infra/production/-/work_items/22579
Resolved
We are able to confirm that the issues affecting the Global Navigation Menu have now been resolved. Users can now successfully navigate to different areas of the platform through the navigation menu. If you continue to experience issues, please reach out to our support team.
Resolved
Project resizing has maintained expected performance in us-west-2.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
All impacted services have now fully recovered.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
All impacted services have now fully recovered.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
Resolved
This issue has been resolved.
Resolved
The backlog has been cleared and ingestion is back to normal.
Resolved
On July 27, our San Jose region experienced a minor networking incident beginning at 16:14 UTC. Some users connected to this region may have experienced disconnects and increased session start times. Traffic was routed away from this region by 16:39 UTC and errors have since returned to baseline.
Resolved
All impacted services have now fully recovered.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved.
Resolved
Email delivery is operating normally.
Resolved
This issue has been resolved.
Resolved
The issue affecting outbound and inbound UK Faster Payments has been resolved. All systems are working normally now. You can stay up to date here on our status page "status page": https://status.sumup.com.
Resolved
This issue is now resolved.
Resolved
Some of our services were impacted by a DNS issue between 14:35 and 15:35 UTC. During this time: clicks and impressions processing was delayed, which resulted in a temporary increase in organic attribution; the Onelink API was partially available; and some processed events are missing geo data. The issue has been fully resolved. Please contact our support team with any questions.
Resolved
All impacted services have now fully recovered.
Resolved
We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
Resolved
Delivery rates have recovered.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved. Google login option is now working as expected Thank you for your patience.
Resolved
Severity Level: High The incident has been resolved. Launches and terminations are now working as expected. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Again, in the event you’re unsure as to whether your service is still impacted by this, please open a support ticket and we’ll get back to you as soon as possible. • https://support.lambdalabs.com/hc/en-us/requests/new To be automatically notified when the status of this incident changes, please click on the “Subscribe to updates” button.
Resolved
We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
Resolved
This incident has been resolved, and service is operating normally again. Thanks for your patience.
Resolved
## Summary On Jul 6, 2026, between 06:51 and 20:17 UTC, Atlassian customers using cloud products in European (EU) regions experienced service disruptions affecting automation rule execution, user search, user picker, and related workflows. The incident began when a core identity service experienced database saturation in EU regions, increasing latency and error rates. While responders worked to restore capacity, an emergency mitigation was applied which blocked automation rules from accessing the identity endpoint. In parallel, the elevated identity latency contributed to a cascading failure in a downstream user search service, degrading user search and user picker experiences across multiple products. Service was progressively restored after additional database read capacity was added, the emergency block was removed, and the user search service was manually scaled up. ## Impact The incident affected customers across multiple Atlassian products in EU regions on Jul 6, 2026 between 06:51 and 20:17 UTC. - **Core Identity service degradation:** elevated intermittent access denied rates were observed across products in EU regions. - **Automation rule execution failures:** automation rules using the default user (Automation for Jira) in Jira, Jira Service Management, and Jira Product Discovery in EU regions failed with a permissions error. - **User search and user picker failures:** user search success rates dropped significantly in EU regions, with user picker capability largely unavailable across products. ## Root Cause The incident originated from a recent configuration change that reduced the cache lifetime for a core identity service. As EU workday traffic ramped up on July 6, 2026, a larger share of requests began reaching the backing database directly rather than being served from cache. The EU databases did not have sufficient regional capacity to absorb the increased load, and database CPU reached saturation, causing elevated intermittent access denied rates. As part of the mitigation, an emergency block was applied to reduce load on the saturated identity service database and prioritize restoring the core identity service. This inadvertently prevented automation rules from passing their pre-execution permission checks, causing them to fail. The extended duration was primarily due to a secondary wave of automation rule failures caused by the processing limit throttling. In parallel, the sustained degradation caused increased latency and intermittent failures across products that depend on these checks, and contributed to a cascading failure in a downstream user search service. As a result, user search and user picker experiences became largely unavailable in EU regions until the permissions service recovered and the user search service was scaled up to restore capacity. ## Remedial Actions Plan & Next Steps We know outages impact customers' productivity. Atlassian is prioritizing the following actions to help prevent similar incidents in future: - **Improve safeguards for high-impact emergency mitigations:** Harden operational tooling so mitigation steps that could disable customer-facing workflows require additional review. - **Strengthen identity infrastructure capacity and change safety:** Review regional database sizing and capacity headroom to reduce the risk of saturation during peak traffic periods, and refine the assessment process for configuration changes so downstream load impact is evaluated before production rollout. - **Strengthen resilience against cascading failures from upstream degradation:** Audit backpressure handling, circuit breaker configuration, and autoscaling behavior in services, so that upstream degradation does not cause broader product impact across user search, user picker, and related experiences. - **Harden replay mechanisms for Automation rule failures:** Increase resilience of automation rules to reduce impact associated with incidents occurring in dependencies.. We recognize how critical reliable product workflows are for our customers, and we apologize to customers who were impacted by this incident. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support
Resolved
We can confirm that the issue was mitigated at 01:30 UTC on 27 July 2026 and the service has resumed normal operation. Customers and partners can view additional details about the incident by logging in to: https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/feed/0D5a700001Kh1F0CAJ or reaching out to Akamai Support. We apologize for the impact and thank you for your patience and continued support. We are committed to making continuous improvements to make our systems better and prevent a recurrence of this issue.
Resolved
Severity Level: Medium The incident has been resolved. The network is now working as expected. Thank you for your patience. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Again, in the event you’re unsure as to whether your service is still impacted by this, please open a support ticket and we’ll get back to you as soon as possible. • https://support.lambdalabs.com/hc/en-us/requests/new To be automatically notified when the status of this incident changes, please click on the “Subscribe to updates” button.
Resolved
We've resolved the incident and the affected service is now operational.
Resolved
iOS submission success rates are back to normal as App Store Connect continues to recover. Submissions that failed during the outage won’t be retried automatically — please resubmit those builds.
Resolved