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Oct 9, 2026

  1. JiraJob processing and scheduling is degraded affecting multiple Atlassian products

    ### Summary On October 1, 2026, between 01:00 and 07:25 UTC, degraded job processing and scheduling impacted Atlassian products including Bitbucket Cloud, Confluence, Forge apps, Jira, and Jira Service Management in all commercial cloud regions. This caused delayed or missed background tasks, such as email-to-ticket processing and scheduled pipelines; interactive product use was not affected. The event was triggered when an unexpected volume of scheduled tasks became due simultaneously, overwhelming our shared job scheduling platform. Automated monitoring detected the incident within three minutes. Recovery began around 03:45 UTC as engineering scaled capacity and the platform worked through the backlog, with full resolution reached in 6 hours and 25 minutes. ### IMPACT Most scheduled tasks stopped running at 01:00 UTC and resumed from about 03:45 UTC. Most delayed work had caught up by about 06:00 UTC, and the remaining delays had cleared by 07:25 UTC. Across affected products: - Recurring scheduled tasks skipped or delayed runs due during the incident; skipped runs were not automatically re-run, and tasks resumed at their next scheduled time. - Most one-time scheduled tasks ran late; a small number may not have run. - Automation rules, including scheduled rules, ran normally, except as noted below. Bitbucket Cloud Scheduled pipelines due between 01:00 and about 03:50 UTC did not run. If a scheduled pipeline did not run during the incident, you can wait for the next scheduled execution or trigger it manually. Other pipeline runs were not affected. Confluence Some calendar event reminders due between 01:00 and about 03:45 UTC were not sent. Forge apps Scheduled triggers stopped at 01:00 UTC and resumed from about 04:00 UTC; missed invocations were not replayed. Goals Start of the month email reminders to update goals could be delayed. Jira and Jira Service Management Incoming emails stayed in their mailboxes and were processed automatically after recovery. Scheduled notifications, such as filter subscriptions, were delayed. In some service projects, automation rules and notifications triggered by SLAs or time in status ran late. SLA timer data remained intact. Atlassian Support Until 07:25 UTC, issues with our support tools may have slowed some of our responses. Based on our investigation to date, we have not identified any loss of work items, pages, repositories, or incoming emails. ### ROOT CAUSE Our shared job scheduling platform operates at high scale under normal conditions. One of the platform consumers scheduled an abnormally high volume of tasks to be executed at the same time on October 1st at 01:00 UTC. This order-of-magnitude surge exceeded our architectural and scaling limits, creating a processing backlog across dependent services. Engineering manually increased capacity to handle the abnormal load, enabling the service to process the backlog and return to normal operations. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS We know that delayed and missed work affects your productivity. We are prioritizing these actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents: - **Enhance workload isolation:** Implement fair scheduling guardrails so volume surges from a single source do not starve or delay tasks across other products. - **Strengthen surge controls:** Add operational capabilities to quickly throttle or pause scheduled workloads from specific sources during unexpected traffic spikes. - **Improve system scaling and recovery:** Enhance platform capacity and optimize scaling processes to handle extreme demand spikes and recover more rapidly. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident. Thanks, Atlassian

    Resolved

  2. HarnessHosted MCP Logins W/ SSO Failing

    ## Okta Application SP-Initiated SSO Login Failures ‌ # Summary ‌ Between October 5, 2026, 18:18 UTC and October 6, 2026, 00:26 UTC, some Harness customers were unable to sign in to the Harness Hosted MCP server via SAML Single Sign-On \(SSO\). The main Harness Portal user authentication remained fully operational. Affected users saw login errors or were redirected to an invalid SSO page instead of completing sign-in. ‌ The issue was caused by breaking changes in a version upgrade of the Harness identity service HarnessID. We fixed it with a series of hotfixes, and SSO login was fully restored for all affected customers. ‌ # Impact ‌ Users signing in to Harness MCP via SAML SSO were unable to complete authentication. Existing MCP sessions that relied on SSO could not be refreshed, so some users had to sign in again and could not. Non-SSO logins to Hosted MCP worked during most of the incident. No customer data was lost or exposed. Customers using their own generic SAML 2.0 application configuration in Okta were not affected. # Root Cause On September 29, 2026, an updated version of the Harness application was published to the Okta Integration Network. The update added support for registering multiple reply \(ACS\) URLs, so that customers running Harness across several regions or environments could configure more than one callback URL. ‌ Harness includes an AssertionConsumerServiceURL value in the SAML authentication request it sends to Okta. Before this update, Okta did not validate that value for application instances without additional ACS URLs configured and instead returned the SAML assertion to the application's default ACS URL. After the update, this validation became active across all existing application instances, including those where the customer had never configured an additional ACS URL. Because the requested value was not present in the instance's registered list, Okta returned an HTTP 400 error. ‌ The updated application went through Okta's standard OIN publishing review, which includes backward-compatibility verification against existing installations of the published integration. This change in validation behavior for instances with no additional ACS URLs configured was not surfaced during that review, so it reached customers at the time of release. # Remediation **Immediate Response** ‌ Two workarounds were published on the status page: sign in from the Harness tile in Okta \(IdP-initiated login\), which was unaffected, or register the application's Okta SSO URL in the Additional ACS URLs field of the Harness Okta application. Harness engaged each reported affected customer directly and validated their sign-in. ‌ **Resolution** ‌ Rolling the application back to the previous version was deliberately avoided, as that would only defer the same disruption to the next release. Every affected customer was instead unblocked through the ACS URL registration, and we are working with Okta to make the ACS URL validation conditional again, so that instances with no additional ACS URLs configured behave exactly as they did before, and no customer action is required. # Action Items To prevent such issues from happening again, Harness will take the following action items ‌ 1. Working with Okta to restore conditional ACS URL validation, so instances with no additional ACS URLs configured behave exactly as before and no customer action is required. 2. Publish a dedicated configuration guide for the Harness OIN application in Harness documentation, including reply \(ACS\) URL requirements. 3. Add an independent pre-release verification step against existing customer configurations for any future update to the published Okta application, alongside Okta's own review. 4. Migrate user authentication to Harness ID, which removes the dependency on this validation behavior entirely.

    Resolved

  3. BufferIssue Connecting & Refreshing YouTube

    We have seen that the issues with YouTube connections have returned back to normal levels now, and all new YouTube connections should go through successfully once again, as well as channel reconnections, too. We're very sorry for the inconvenience this created and hope everything is running smoothly for you now.

    Resolved

  4. BufferBuffer Service Disruption

    The issue affecting Buffer has been fully resolved. Our team has confirmed that the service is now operating normally. We apologise for any disruption this may have caused and appreciate your patience throughout the resolution process. If you encounter any further issues, please let us know.

    Resolved

  5. GitHubDisruption with some GitHub services

    On October 5, 2026, between 23:05 UTC and 00:11 UTC on October 6, some users experienced slow page loads, timeouts, and errors when accessing organization and enterprise billing, licensing, and settings pages. On average, the error rate was 1.9% and peaked at 13.8% of requests to the service that powers these pages.<br /><br />This was caused by a networking failure, which disrupted connectivity between one of our on-premises datacenter regions and a subset of cloud-hosted regional database services. We mitigated the incident by shifting the database traffic to a healthy region.<br /><br />We are working to make regional database failover faster and more complete, reduce timeouts so these pages fail fast instead of hanging, and add latency-based alerting to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future. We continue to partner with our cloud provider to understand the underlying network failure.

    Resolved

  6. OVHcloud - Public Cloud[GRA][Compute - Instance] - Compute Instance Incident Notification

    We are pleased to inform you that the incident affecting our Compute - Instance offering has been resolved. <b>Start time :</b> 09/10/2026 10:23 UTC <b>End time :</b> 09/10/2026 10:37 UTC <b>Root Cause :</b> A service disruption occurred due to an unexpected infrastructure malfunction. We apologize for any inconvenience caused and appreciate your understanding.

    Resolved

  7. Vonage APIVideo: Issues impacting Media Connection

    Vonage services have been fully restored following today's service interruption. A Media Connection server was in an unstable state in the EU (Frankfurt) region from 2026-10-09 at 09:50:54 UTC to 2026-10-09 at 09:51:54 UTC. Some customers may have experienced media connection interruptions during this period. All services have been restored. The faulty instance was automatically detected and removed from rotation. For any additional questions, please contact support at support@api.vonage.com

    Resolved

  8. SinchEngage - Zoho CRM Temporary Outage

    We are writing to inform you regarding an incident that affected our Engage - Zoho CRM services during the below time-frame. Incident Start Time: 2026-10-09 07:00 UTC Incident End Time: 2026-10-09 07:30 UTC During the incident you may have experienced issues sending messages, reviewing reports and other functionalities. A fix has been deployed and the issue was resolved. Thank you for understanding and our sincere apologies for any disruptions to your business.

    Resolved

  9. SnowflakeINC20000239

    Snowflake Engineering has completed the postmortem of this service incident. A detailed Root Cause Analysis \(RCA\) is available on the Snowflake Community site: [https://community.snowflake.com/s/article/INC20000239](https://community.snowflake.com/s/article/INC20000239)

    Resolved

  10. OVHcloud - Public Cloud[WAW1][Compute - Instance] - Compute Instance Incident Notification

    We had an incident on our Compute - Instance offering which has now been resolved. Here are some supplementary details : <b>Start time :</b> 09/10/2026 08:30 UTC <b>End time :</b> 09/10/2026 08:36 UTC <b>Impacted Service(s) :</b> Some instances in the WAW1 region were unreachable. <b>Customers Impact :</b> Some customers were temporarily unable to access instances located in the specified region. <b>Root Cause :</b> A service disruption occurred due to an unexpected infrastructure malfunction. We apologize for any inconvenience caused and appreciate your understanding.

    Resolved

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